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ABSTRACT
THE ANDICAN UPRISING, 13 MAY 2005
Kuzu, Durukan
M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar
September 2008
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union state building process in Uzbekistan 
became subjected to the social, political and economic problems. When all these 
factors came together Andican Uprising occurred on 13 May 2005.  In this thesis I 
tried to clarify the basic motives behind the Andican Uprising. By investigating these 
motives, I attempted to shed light on religious fundamentalism that the Government 
of Uzbekistan faced after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a part of problematical 
state building process, role of domestic politics in the emergence of the uprising was 
also covered by pointing out the characteristics of clan politics and civil society in 
Uzbekistan. Reasons of the event were also investigated on international level. In this 
context geopolitical strategy of international actors, the colored revolutions and U.S 
– Uzbekistan relations were explored. Economic integration of Uzbekistan to world 
economy and its failing reformation process was explored. While promotion of 
iv
democracy in Uzbekistan was necessitating broader freedom for society, religious 
fundamentalism led the government to intensify its authoritarian character. These 
two conflicting characteristics of the country created two sides over which 
international actors played their cards. While the west insisted on the 
democratization of the country the east supported the Uzbek government’s harsh 
measurement over religious groups.  Andican Uprising is an important case in which 
it is possible to find all prominent characteristics of the Uzbek politics, and therefore 
this thesis can be taken as a laboratory work in which all relevant traces were 
investigated to understand Uzbekistan.
Key words: Andican Uprising, Uzbekistan, Karimov, Ekremiye, Religious 
Fundamentalism, Civil Society, and Clan Politics.
vÖZET
ANDİCAN AYAKLANMASI, 13 MAYIS 2005
Kuzu, Durukan
Master tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar
Eylül 2008
Sovyetler Birliğinin çöküşünden bu yana Özbekistan, devlet yaratma 
sürecinde  ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi olmak üzere bir çok problemle karşı karşıya 
kaldı. Tüm bu faktörlerin bir araya gelmesiyle 13 Mayıs 2005 tarihinde 
Özbekistan’ın Andican vilayetinde büyük ölçekli bir ayaklanma ortaya cıktı. Bu 
tezde Andican ayaklanmasının  ardında yatan sebepler açıklığa kavuşturulmaya 
çalışıldı. Bu sebepleri araştırırken öncelikle Sovyetler Birliğinin çöküsünün ardından 
Özbekistan’ın yüz yüze kaldığı dini koktenciliğin sebeplerini, doğasını ve derecesini 
aydınlatmaya çalıştım. Özbekistanda mevcut  sivil toplum kuruluşlarının ve klan 
ilişkilerinin özelliklerini incelemek suretiyle de ülkenin iç politikasi üzerinde ayrıca 
durdum. Bu tezde iç politikanın yanı sıra uluslararası konjonktürün Andican 
ayaklanmasında nasıl bir etkisi olmuş olabileceğini görebilmek için Orta Asya da 
görülen renkli devrimlerle birlikte Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Özbekistanla olan 
vi
ilişkilerinin bir analizi yapıldı. Karimov hükümetinin mikroekonmik açıdan başarısız 
mali reformları da ayrıca incelendi. Bu çalışmanın sonucunda varılan nokta 
Özbekistan’ın iki önemli yapısal özelliği arasında sıkışıp kaldığı yönünde oldu. Bir 
yandan demokrasinin ilerletilmesi icin gerekli görülen özgürlükler öteki yandan 
demokrasinin özünü oluşturan laik yapıya aykırı dini koktenciliğe karşı arttırılan 
otoriter yapı mevcut durumu oldukça zorlaştırdı. Batı demokrasi savaşı verirken 
yakın ilişkilerden medet uman Dogu otoriter Karimov hükümetini destekledi. Hali 
hazırda ekonomik problemlerden şikayetci halk Karimov’un otoriter politikalarından 
iyice rahatsızlık duymaya başladı. Dini gruplar ekonomik olanaklar sunarak yandaş 
elde etmek suretiyle bu rahatsızlıktan faydalandı, aynı zamanda sosyal baskıdan 
bıkmış Özbekler, Amerika ve Avrupa Birliği tarafindan sivil toplum kuruluşları 
aracılığıyla desteklendi. Bu doğrultuda Andican ayklanması tüm bu faktörleri 
içerisinde barındıran sosyal bir vakkadır ve bu tez Özbekistanı anlamak için bu 
ilişkilerin incelendiği bir laboratuvar çalışması olarak algılanmalıdır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Andican Ayaklanması, Özbekistan, Karimov, Ekremiye, 
Kökten Dincilik, Sivil Toplum, Klan Politikası.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On 13 May 2005 the Uzbek government suppressed mass protests in Andican 
by violent means leaving many questions unanswered. Contradictory views on the 
nature of uprising were accompanied by different interpretations by international 
actors over the Uzbek government’s response to the event.  Not only were 
international institutions and foreign countries divided on Andican question but also 
scholars have developed different explanations to clarify what happened on 13 May 
2005. 
In this thesis, I evaluate domestic and foreign factors, which had an important 
role in both the formation and suppression of the Andican Uprising. Through the 
evaluation of these factors I intend to present an authentic picture of Andican
Uprising. An investigation of the Andican Uprising not only exposes problematical 
characteristics of the state building process in Uzbekistan but also reveals the 
strategic concerns of international actors in the whole of Central Asia. In this study, I 
will examine the specific characteristics of the Uzbek politics and their implications 
2for regional and international politics. In this context, the Andican Uprising is a 
unique event, which enables us to understand the important factors in both regional 
security perceptions and strategic alignments and rivalries.
Although, I will base my arguments on the causal relationships between 
different factors in this thesis, I begin from the perspective that in the social sciences 
every causal relationship is subjected to the effect of unique events, which always 
possess their own conditions. In the literature, most of the scholars and international 
actors have tried to explain the event from a one-sided perspective and 
underestimated the other factors, which were actually much more effective than 
assumed. I will try to fill this gap in the literature.
In the first chapter, I explore the extent and nature of religious 
fundamentalism, which threatened the secular character of Uzbekistan for long time, 
in order to determine whether the Andican Uprising was an Islamic revolution 
organized and assisted by extremist groups. With this purpose in mind, in addition to 
describing Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, I examine 
ideological motives and organizational structure of Ekremiye group.  Effect of threats 
presented by the first two extremist organizations on the Uzbek government’s fear of 
the activities of the Ekremiye group will be questioned. I will also investigate the 
direct connection of this organization with the uprising in order to examine the role 
of religious pretexts, which Islam Karimov used in order to justify his aggressive 
response to Andican Uprising.
In the second chapter, economic factors, which may have contributed to the 
formation of the Andican Uprising, will be investigated. Failing economic reforms of 
Uzbek Government after the collapse of Soviet Union and its recent practices that 
3increased economic discontent among society prior to the Andican Uprising will be 
pointed out. 
In this context, failure of government to carry out feasible economic reforms 
will be connected to the economic complaints that were voiced by protesters during 
the Andican Uprising. I will also try to clarify whether or not the government’s failed 
economic policies contributed to the formation and amplification of Ekremiye group 
whose members applied religious principles to their commercial activities.     
In the third chapter, how international, regional and domestic politics jointly 
might have affected the genesis of Andican uprising will be discussed. How the 
colored revolutions might have affected Karimov’s response to Andican uprising will 
be mentioned within the context of regional politics. At this point I will compare 
these revolutions with the Andican Uprising to decide if Uzbekistan was also 
threatened by power politics in the region as Karimov assumed. I will question the 
possible involvement of the U.S. in Andican Uprising by analyzing its  relations with 
Uzbek government before the uprising. 
 Karimov believed that the uprising was organized to topple his regime and 
stressed the role of the U.S funded civil society organizations in the formation of the 
Andican Uprising. I examine whether the capacity of Uzbek civil society 
organizations was sufficient to accomplish this.
In addition to these factors, role of clan rivalry in Uzbekistan will also be 
mentioned to explain how domestic politics might have led to the rise of mass 
protests in the country. The competition between clan affiliates for getting power and 
important positions in the government will be revealed to understand its 
repercussions for the Andican Uprising. 
4In the fourth chapter, what happened on 12-13-14 May 2005 in Andican will 
be portrayed. Although the evidence is limited to the information that Uzbek 
government and refugees from the conflict, I will collate these two sources to obtain 
a more authentic version of what really happened in Andican. In this part of the 
thesis extent of violence, number of dead, existence of religious slogans and 
economic complaints during the events will be investigated to reveal the nature of 
Andican uprising.
Most of the assessments made by scholars and organizations are based on 
interviews and thus subjective. Due to the strict control over press members, only 
video record revealing what happened during the protest was delivered by the Uzbek 
government and used in the trial of insurgents. However this video record was also 
reported to have biased characteristics and supposed to be distorted. At this point, 
lack of an objective assessment makes it necessary to scrutinize the event from 
contradictory perspectives simultaneously. In addition to the portray of the events in 
Andican on 12-13 May 2005, aftermath and foreign policy implications of the event 
will also be given in detail. 
5CHAPTER II
THE RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND ANDICAN 
UPRISING
Andican Uprising, which occurred on the night of 12 May 2005, exhibited the 
peak of an intensifying conflict between the Uzbek government and public groups.  
The nature of the uprising is dependent on the prior events, which contributed much 
to the formation of a common discontent in Uzbek society. The uprising was 
spontaneous by nature, and increased in scale only with the participation of people 
from different groups, but in the first stage it was obviously flamed by a well-
organized small group of people who attempted to free prisoners accused of being 
members of Islamist Ekremiye movement. 
Details of the event and real factors behind the public support and 
participation to this specific event will be given under following chapters but now the 
preceding affairs related to the Ekremiye movement and government precautions 
leading to Andican Uprising will be the main subject of this part. Hereby, the 
phenomenology of Ekremiye movement, rationale and fears of the Uzbek 
6government in its responses to religious activities within the country and extent of 
these religious factors will be analyzed.
In June 2004, 23 businessmen were arrested. They were: Rasuljon 
Ajikhaliov, Abdumajit Ibreagimov, Tursunbek Nazarov, Makhamadshokir Artikov, 
Odil Makhsdaliyev, Dadakhan Nodirov, Shamsitdin Atamatov, Ortikboy Akbarov, 
Rasul Akbarov, Shavkat Shokirov, Abdurauf Khamidov, Muzaffar Kodirov, 
Mukhammadaziz Mamdiyev, Nasibillo Maksudov, Adkhamjon Babojonov, 
Khakimjon Zakirov, Gulomjon Nadirov, Musojon Mirzaboyev, Dilshchodbek 
Mamadiyev, Abdulvosid Igamov, Shokurjon Shakirov, and Ravshanbek 
Mazimjnov.1 These 23 members of the Ekremiye group were accused of attempting 
to disturb the country’s constitutional order by organizing an illegal group, handing 
out pamphlet forming a threat to public security and being members of a religious 
radical organization.2
As it is seen, the charges in these trials leading to social uprising in Andican 
on 12-13 May 2005 had strong religious motivations. That’s why, before reaching a 
conclusion about the accuracy of the charges against these 23 businessmen, I believe 
that to explain the Uzbek government’s fear of religious activities would be helpful 
to make an accurate analysis. 
                                                
1 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- The Andijan Massacre13 May 
2005”, HRW Reports Vol. 17 No5   (June, 2005).
2 BBC Monitoring News file, Twenty-three Uzbeks stand trial on anti-stage charges, 12 February 
2005, (Text of report by Russia based web site Ferghana.ru on 11 February and Article 205 of the 
Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan).
72.1 The Government’s Fear of Islamic Movements
In today’s Central Asian countries Islam has played a crucial role in political 
life.3 Due to the anti-religious characteristics of the communist idea, after the 
Russian Revolution, central authorities generally disregarded the spiritual traditions 
of the people4 and authorities regarded religion as a dangerous factor, around which 
Muslim people could rally in order to form an autonomous political existence.5 In 
this sense Islam was seen as one of the chief internal threats to the Soviet Union and 
thus continuously oppressed. 6 However, “Islam has now been transformed from a 
victim of Soviet oppression into a threat to regional security, democratization and the 
establishment of open societies in the region.”7  
 The turning point can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the peoples of the Central Asian countries thought 
that they would practice their spiritual beliefs without the restraints of prior 
communist administrations.
 However, in the same countries there were elite groups who adopted the 
principles of Soviet culture and feared of religious factions would claim political 
power, which they thought, might lead the country to backwardness. In Uzbekistan 
Islam Karimov thought that lack of authority in the country would inevitably result in 
the wrong kind of religious activities leading the country to Shari’a rule; in his own 
words: 
                                                
3 For Further information on political role of Islam in Central Asia see, Mehrdad Haghayegh , Islam 
and Politics in Central Asia (New York, St. Martin’s Press,1995)
4 Edward Allworth, Central Asia, and 130 years of Russian Dominance: A Historical Overview
(Durham, Duke University Press, 1994)
5 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations  (New York, New York University 
Press, 2000)
6 Alexandre Bennigsen, Islam in Soviet Union: general presentation (Ankara: METU, 1985.)
7 Adeeb Khalid, “A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan”, International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, 35 (2003) p. 574.
8It is common knowledge that the communist ideology –which lacks 
spirituality, is fanatical and anti-national in character- contributed greatly to 
the formation of prerequisites for religious fundamentalism and traditionalism 
within post-Soviet space.8  
The new role of Islam in the identity of Uzbek nation and the growing 
influence of Wahhabi Salafism were the evidence used to justify the fears of post-
Soviet governments.
2.1.1 Salafism In Uzbekistan
Wahhabism9 was created by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 18th century 
and after the first half of 1950s started to spread into the Central Asian Countries. 
Wahhabi doctrine in Uzbekistan is generally accepted to have affiliation with 
Salafism, which arose in the middle of 19th century. The first proponents of Salafiyya 
were Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and 
Rashad Rida (1865-1935). In Arabic, basic meaning of the word Salaf is “the 
preceding.” However in Islamic literature this term refers to an understanding in 
which, “Interpretations not based on the original sources of the religion are viewed as 
distortions that lead Muslims to stray from the path of God.”10
According to Salafism, practices of the first Muslims should be taken as the 
basis of Islamic rules, thus any changes in interpretation of Islam should be corrected 
by a return to primitive religious practices. “The 1990s saw the emergence of a clear 
                                                
8Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on The Threshold of The Twenty-first Century  (Cambridge, MA: Curzon, 
1997) pp. 19-29.
9 Any religious activity, whatever its context is, has been called ‘wahhabism’ in Soviet and Post-
Soviet literature.
10 Juan José Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim 
Communities in Europe”, The Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no.3  (2006), p.1.
9split between reformist or academic Salafism (Salafiyya al-ilmiyyah) and fighting or 
“jihadi” Salafism (Salafiyya al-Jihadiyyah).”11 The latter faction was violently 
hostile to non-believers and people who strayed from the path of God as a result of 
modernization causing changes in basic implications of Islamic rule. This fanatical 
attitude leaves no room for collaboration with the state or authorized Islamic 
foundations.
Salafism supporters have been present in Uzbekistan since 1950. One of the 
most important scholars who can recite the Quran, in Uzbekistan Abdulhakim12
qori13, was known as an adherent of the Salafism.  Kokand preacher, Muhammad 
Rustamov, who is known as Hindustani14 also contributed to spread of Salafism in 
Uzbekistan through his underground teachings based on the principles of Hanafi 
Islam. 
His students later formed Salafi movement in Uzbekistan and paved a way 
for militant Islamic organizations to rise. “These students included Allama 
Rahmatulla qori(d.1981), who joined Wahhabis while in Andizhan. An even more 
prominent figure was Abduwali qori Mirzaev, the imam of the great mosque in 
Andizhan.”15
During the glasnost period, students of Hindustani found opportunity to 
mobilize support and give voice to their demands for religious freedom. In January 
                                                
11 Juan José Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim 
Communities in Europe”, p. 3.
12 “Abdulhakim qori from the city of Margelan  is thought to be the father of the Wahhabites. He 
became a Wahhabite as early as 1954.” See Ashirbek Muminov “ Traditional and Modern Religious-
Theological Schools in Central Asia” in Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, ed. 
Lena Jonson and Murad Esenov.( Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1999). 
www.ca-c.org/dataeng/09.muminov.shtml . (March 25,2008)
13 Immams who are capable and authorized to interpret and recite the Quran were used to be called as 
qori.
14Hindustani (1892-1989) was the Muslim leader of an underground Islamic movement in Tajikistan 
during the Soviet rule.
15
Vitaly V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, (California, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, 
2003) p. 32. 
10
1991, a separate Islamic Renaissance Party in Uzbekistan was a founded and other 
religious political groups followed. Groups espousing an Islamic political agenda 
such İslam Leşkerleri (warriors) and Adalet were also formed at the beginning of 
1990s. The ideological motive of the group was to replace the current government 
with an Islamic State. Adalet party tried to operate within the government’s sphere of 
control to bring order to local mahallas through opposing law enforcements.16
It was originally created as a national militia of Muslims. The active members 
of Adalet patrolled the streets, detained suspicious persons, and clamped 
down on gambling, trade in alcoholic drinks, prostitution, and other 
infringements of "Islamic morals and law." In Namangan and Ferghana, so-
called "supporters of Islamic morals" began to enforce their understanding of 
the norms of Shari'a.17
2.1.2. Religious Opposition Just after the Collapse of the Soviet Union
           Just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional threats which frightened 
Karimov was about the formation of religious fractions in neighboring countries. For 
example, Islamic Renaissance Party in Tajikistan was claiming political power in 
opposition to the government of Rakhmon Nabiev. 18The rise of Taliban movement 
in Afghanistan was another factor, which increased his anxiety. Despite the existence 
of such religious threats to the modernization of Uzbekistan, Karimov, in his first 
years, tried to accommodate the spiritual traditions of the people and even prompted 
institutions serving to the proper implications of religious traditions.19 However at 
                                                
16 Vitaly V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan,  p. 34. 
17 Shukhrat Yovkochev, “Politization of Islam in Uzbekistan Before and After Independence,” 
www.birlik.net/page-18.uk, (April 3,2008)
18 David Galemba, “The Authoritarian Roadblock on Post-Soviet Central Asia’s Long Road to 
Religious Freedom” Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion 8, no.2 (2007), p. 25.
19 “In the early 1990s Karimov attempted to strengthen his position as a Muslim through public 
displays of piety, such as quoting from the Koran during his speeches, making the haj and suggesting 
that he adhered to Islamic dietary requirements... It was vital that Karimov reinforces his connection 
11
the same time, he established a strict state control, which left no space for extremism. 
Karimov declared that he would absolutely not tolerate any case of the formation of a 
political opposition based on religion. 
Thus more concrete threats appeared when Karimov observed the formation 
of dissent religious parties in Uzbekistan. “In February 1992, Adolat, Birlik, Erk, and 
IRP (Islamic Renaissance Party) asked Karimov to start negotiations in Namangan as 
a united opposition group.”20  Some of the dissent groups were not organized 
according to religious motives (Erk and Birlik, for example), but they had also been 
supported by Islamist groups against Karimov’s party. Regardless of whether their 
principles were religious or secular, almost all opposition parties enjoyed only 
limited participation in political life. The most important opposition groups, Birlik 
and Erk, and the proscribed Islamic Renaissance Party were cut off from the political 
life in the country, “and its leaders have either been jailed or sent to live in Turkey 
and elsewhere outside the country.”21 Karimov closed and prohibited Adalet in 
March 1992 and put 27 of its members in prison.22  The leader of IRP, Abdulla 
Utaev, was detained in December of the same year and all such Islamic groups were 
made illegal. In 1993, after receiving 12 percent of the votes in presidential elections, 
the leader of Erk Muhammed Salih was forced to move abroad and his party was 
                                                                                                                                         
to Islam because Uzbek culture was experiencing a ‘ re-Islamization’ represented by the surge in the 
number of mosques a renewed interest in the ritual and dogma of the faith and an increase in students 
studying Arabic ” See Reuel R. Hanks, “Dynamics of Islam, identity, and institutional rule in 
Uzbekistan: Constructing a paradigm for Conflict Resolution”, Communist and Post Communist 
Studies Vol.40 (2007) pp. 215-216. 
20 Reuel R. Hanks, “Dynamics of Islam, identity, and institutional rule in Uzbekistan: Constructing a 
paradigm for Conflict Resolution”, p. 215.
21 Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1995) 
p.156. For further detail on Erk and Birlik Party see Abdujabar  Abduvakhitov, “Islamic Revivalism 
in Uzbekistan” in ‘Russia’s Muslim Frontiers,  ed. Dale Eickleman ( U.SA Indiana University Press 
1993) pp. 79 –101.
22 Center for Defense Information, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, 
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm, (March 08, 2008)
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forbidden.23 These strict policies of Karimov over the political parties were accepted 
as the most important factor, which empowered the radical groups. For instance 
Hunter argued that, “The stifling of democracy and the banning of the opposition 
ruled out peaceful engagement in politics and radicalized Uzbek Muslim activists.”24
In this framework administrative mechanism to regulate and keep religion 
under state control was an indispensable part of government politics. In 1998 the 
Uzbek government founded O’zbekiston Musulmonlar Idorasi (The Spiritual 
Administration of Muslims in Uzbekistan) in order to check and control the content 
of all literature and visual media stuff coming to Uzbekistan from abroad. In the 
same year officials declared that any kind of organization was strictly prohibited 
from undertaking any activity related to religion in the absence of state control.25
Muslim directorate of Uzbekistan was put in charge by government to control 
extremist groups; but sometimes it went beyond controlling illegal activities. For 
instance “in January 1998, Muslim Directorate outlawed the use of loudspeakers in 
mosques because it is not one of the fundamentals of Islam.”26
The struggle over religious extremism in Uzbekistan was supported by 
further regulations in 1998. By a “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations,” the Uzbek government banned private training in religion.27  
Amendments in the criminal code made religious activities without state control 
subject to five years of punishment. 
The main provisions of the Criminal Code used to repress religious activities 
of unregistered Muslim groups are as follow: Article 156 (stirring up 
                                                
23 Vitaly V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, pp. 24, 34.
24 Shireen T. Hunter, “Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia”, SAIS Review Vol. XXI No. 2 
(Summer-Fall 2001) p. 76.
25 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1999  (New York: Human Rights Watch, 
1999), p. 307.
26 Adeeb Khalid, “A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan”, International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, Vol.35 (2003) p. 590.
27 Adeeb Khalid, “A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan, p. 588.
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national, racial and religious hatred), Article 159 (anti-constitutional activity), 
Article 242 (organizing a criminal society), Article 244-1 (inciting mass 
disorder) and Article 244-2 (production and distribution of materials which 
create a threat to public security and public order).28
As it is seen above, state control over religious activities was becoming more 
intense every year. Thus the emergence of these radical groups was a result of both 
their ideological motives and official state control over them. However 
intensification of the rules regarding illegal activities with respect to religious issues 
and the control over the religious activities by the government became stricter, when 
radical organizations increased the scope of their activities. Due to these dialectical
relationships, it is problematic to posit a simple causal relationship between the 
policies of the Uzbek government and extremist groups’ subsequent reactions.  
2.1.3. Hizb ut-Tahrir
2.1.3.1. Roots of the Organization
    
Hizb ut-Tahrir is an organization originally founded by Taquiddin Nabhani in 
1953. Nabhani was known as one of the most important Islamic scholars in Eastern 
Jerusalem .29 Like the leader of the movement himself, most of the members were 
mainly located in Arab countries, and thus the organization did not penetrate into the 
Central Asia countries for some time. Karagiannis argued that the Hizb ut-Tahrir
                                                
28 Human Rights Without Frontiers, “Freedom of Religion and Belief in Uzbekistan”, 
http://www.hrwf.net/advocacy/ext/0226%20UzbekReport.doc, (February 24, 2008); “Criminal 
Code of Uzbeksitan” is also available at:
http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/34/fc/a45cbf3cc66c17f04420786aa164.htm , 
(February 24, 2008 )
29 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (London, Yale University Press, 
2002) p.116.
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began to be active in Uzbekistan after 1995.  It is assumed that Jordanian 
missionaries who came to Central Asia had set up the first circles of the organization 
in Uzbekistan. Basic idea lying behind the formation of this organization was the 
desire to re-establish the caliphate and consequently to create an Islamic state under 
which all Muslims would be able to unite.30
Due to increasing government control, members of the organization began to 
flee to Kyrgyzstan from Andican and Ferghana provinces. In order to evaluate the 
extent of threat posed by this organization, the extent of its membership and the 
results of their activities should be questioned.
 However due to the underground activities of the organization, number of its 
members and assumptions on the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir does not go beyond 
prediction; although, “it is difficult to get the exact number of members, most 
estimates vary between 15,000 to 20,000.”31 In 2003 International Crisis Group 
reported that, “Uzbekistan alone holds some 7000 prisoners associated with Hizb ut-
Tahrir.”32
2.1.3.2. The Ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir
The most appropriate way of analyzing the extent of threat the group poses is 
to evaluate its political claims and arguments in religious subjects. Although, as 
Mukhametrakhimova states “party members claim that their aim is to achieve 
                                                
30 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami”, Europe-Asia 
Studies,Vol. 58 No. 2 (March 2006) pp. 261 – 280.
31 Saule Mukhametrakhimova, “Perception and Treatment of the “Extremist” Islamic Group Hizb ut-
Tahrir by Central Asian Governments”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4 No. 2 (2006) 
p. 51.
32 International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, ICG Asia 
Report No 5 (30 June 2003) p. 17.
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political change through peaceful means”33; and despite the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir
is not accounted among terrorist organizations, the ideological motives of the group 
are strongly related with Salafism and other radical movements. The organization 
describes itself as follows;
“Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Its objective is to 
resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that executes the 
systems of Islam and carries its call to the world.”34  Democratic regimes are 
perceived by the organization, as a revolt against the will of God.35
The organization identifies its methods, which would be used in establishing 
an Islamic State, as non violent. Rather on this purpose, they stress the mobilization 
of ummah (Worldwide Muslim community) by political means. 36 The organization 
claim that the most important function of the state should be “propagation of 
invitation to Islam”37 Hizb ut-Tahrir allows non- Muslims to follow their own beliefs 
but at the same time all citizens of an Islamic State are considered to be subjected to 
Islamic rules without discriminating whether they are Muslim or not. 38 In this sense, 
implementation of Islamic rule on non-Muslims in Islamic states makes religious 
freedom to non-Muslims meaningless.
                                                
33 Saule Mukhametrakhimova, “Perception and Treatment of the “Extremist” Islamic Group Hizb ut-
Tahrir by Central Asian Governments,” p. 51.
34 Hizb ut-Tahrir, “About Us”, 
http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle
&artid=6&page=1 (July 25,2008)
35 Hizb ut-Tahrir Turkey, “ Islamin Demokrasi Hakkindaki Gorusu (Islam’s perception of 
democracy)” http://www.hilafet.com/kitaplar/hizb-ut_tahrir/index.htm (July 25,2008) 
36  Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, “Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Struggle for Khilafah”, http://www.hizb-ut-
tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/297  (July 25, 2008) “Hizb ut-Tahrir calls upon you to mobilise your 
forces and rally your ranks to help and support it in its work to establish the Khilafah state” See “O 
Muslims! Shape the Middle East by your own hands, for you are its rightful owners” ,  
http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/152 ( July 25,2008)
37Hizb ut-Tahrir, Draft Constitution Article 11, http://www.hizb-uttahrir.info/english/constitution.htm
(July 25, 2008)
38 Hizb ut-Tahrir, Draft Constitution Article 7, http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/constitution.htm
(July 25, 2008)
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Although the party claims that “Hizb ut-Tahrir has no association with any 
other Islamic or non-Islamic movement, party or organization by name or deed”39
and there is no evidence revealing that this organization has been directly involved in 
terrorist attacks, the extent of the threat this group presents clear from its assistance 
to religious extremist movements, which challenges the secular character of the state.
In justifying this assistance, Rashid makes reference to an interview he conducted 
with one of the movement’s leaders in Central Asia: 
The HT supports the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and many HT 
members have fled to safety in Afghanistan…  If the IMU (Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan) suddenly appears in Ferghana Valley, HT activists 
will not sit idly by and allow the security forces to kill them.40
While Rashid’s writings are journalistic and not strictly academic his 
interviews with local people continue to be one of the most popular studies related to 
the region. With referring  to periodicals of the organization,  Zeyno Baran,  claimed 
that, after 2001 HT started to demonstrate an inclination to approve the use of violent 
methods in their movements. In HT periodical Al-Waie dating to June 2001, it was 
stated that suicide attacks are an acceptable form of protesting activities.  Baran also 
states that in March 2002, HT also claimed “suicide bombs in Israel are a legitimate 
tactic of war.”41
The Ideological motives of the organization represent an obstacle to any 
country, which tries to integrate itself to world economics and politics. According to 
the 186th article of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s draft constitution, 
The State is forbidden to belong to any organization that is based on 
something other than Islam or which applies non-Islamic rules. This includes 
international organizations like the United Nations, the International Court of
                                                
39 Hizb-ut Tahrir Media Office, “Does Hizb ut-Tahrir operate under any other name?”
http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/about.htm#3   (July 25,2008)
40 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, p.134.  
41 Zeyno Baran,S Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia  And the 
Caucasus: Implications for the EU.
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Justice, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and regional 
organizations like the Arab League.42
In this context governments of Muslim post-Soviet countries, which have 
experienced a period of democratization, are in danger of being targeted by Hizb ut-
Tahrir. 
2.1.3.3. Hizb ut-Tahrir Operations in Uzbekistan
After the explosions in 2004 around the Israeli and the US embassies, and at 
the general prosecutor’s office, which resulted in thirty and at least three casualties 
from Uzbek security forces, President Karimov held Hizb ut-Tahrir responsible for 
the attacks. After the blasts, Karimov stated, “the radical extremist organization 
Khizb ut-takhrir (Freedom Party) is behind the bloody terrorist acts in the Uzbek 
capital.”43 The organization did not accept the responsibility and claimed that their 
operational method was non-violent.44 However in the same speech, Karimov 
continued to assert that this organization uses violent means in order to achieve its 
goals.
Some international human rights organizations that take Hizb ut- Tahrir under 
their wing and protect them say they are innocent lambs. But if this group 
wanted to create a caliphate (Islamic state) and overthrow the government, 
how can they do it peacefully, without bloodshed?45
                                                
42 Hizb ut-Tahrir, Draft Constitution Article 186, http://www.hizbuttahrir.info/english/constitution.htm
(July 25,2008)
43Vilor Niyazmatov, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan not involved in blasts-Karimov”, ITAR-TASS 
World Service (1 August 2004), available at Factiva database (April 3,2008)
44 Malcolm Haslett, “Islamists blamed for Uzbek attacks”, BBC News (2 August 2 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3528282.stm, (April 3, 2008)
45 BBC Monitoring Central Asia, “Embassy, earlier bombings blamed on same group” (1 August 
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The opposition of the Uzbek government to Hizb ut-Tahrir not only reveals its effort 
to protect the secular character of the state but also indicates its tolerance for 
different kinds of religious beliefs to coexist as long as they have a pacific character. 
Although members of a very minor Shia group in Uzbekistan believe that the 
government is not defending the right of Shias sufficiently, state approved imams of 
the group generally agree that “the country’s Shias do not have any difficulties with 
Uzbek authorities.”46
On the other hand, the HT movement’s approach towards Shias is a considerable 
threat to public safety. By interviewing with local leaders of the organization, Ahmet 
Rashid sheds light on the Hizb ut-Tahrir’s attitude towards shias. “HT is violently 
anti-Shia; the group would expel all Shia Muslims from Central Asia if it came to 
power, a stance that would clearly alienate the Shia communities in Southern 
Uzbekistan.”47 Consequently, Hizb ut-Tahrir threatens not only the secular principles 
of Uzbek state but also the region’s Shia minorities.   
2.1.4. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
2.1.4.1. The Historical Background of IMU
Uzbek Islamists declared the formation of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
in 1996 and defined their primary goal as the removal of Karimov regime forcibly 
                                                
46 F18News, “Uzbekistan Tight Restrictions on Shia Muslim Minority”,
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=307&pdf=Y (March 6, 2008)
47 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, p. 123.
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and creation of the Islamic rule in Uzbekistan.48 However later, they extended the 
scope of their activities into the whole of Central Asia and redefined their basic goal 
as the establishment of an Islamic state covering all Central Asia. “In the summer of 
2001, the IMU announced it had renamed itself as the Islamic Party of Turkestan 
(IPT)”49
It is generally assumed that IMU has bases in Tajikistan and northern part of 
Afghanistan. It is strongly associated with the Taliban ideology.50 “In return, IMU 
received money from bin Laden, safe heaven from the Taliban, and a hand in the 
drug trafficking trade between Afghanistan and Central Asia.”51
 The Uzbek government’s strict policy with respect to Islamic groups after 
1992-1993 prompted the leaders of the IMU,Tahir Yuldashev, a leader of the Adalet
party, Jumbaoi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (latter known as Juma Namangani), the 
movement’s military leader as well as their rank–and-file members to flee abroad, 
mainly to Afghanistan and Tajikistan, where the Islamic Tajik opposition (known as 
United Tajik Opposition or UTO) enjoyed considerable success in their struggle 
against the communist government of Tajikistan.52 After the crack down on Islamic 
groups in Uzbekistan, future members of the IMU volunteered in the Tajik civil war, 
survived and flourished in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Karimov’s fear of the 
movements in Afghanistan and Tajikistan was justified as these two countries 
provided bases to the terrorist organization which has become a threat to all Central
Asian countries.
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2.1.4.2. IMU in Uzbekistan after 1999
IMU became the most important issue for the Uzbek government after the 
terrorist bombings of 16 February 1999. Six bombs were exploded in cars around the 
government buildings in Tashkent just before the Karimov’s scheduled talking in 
Cabinets of Ministers. 
Sixteen people were killed and upwards of 128 were injured. Several bombs 
exploded in Tashkent's central Mustakillik Square. At least one bomb went off 
outside the National Bank. Others detonated near outside the Cabinet of Ministers, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Nodirabegim.53
 In the following days, government accused IMU after arresting more than 
thirty suspects, and six terrorists held responsible for bombings were sentenced to 
death. The authorities believed that this was a sabotage planned in order to 
assassinate Karimov and to overthrow the government.54  Since then, the Uzbek 
government intensified its precautions against religious activities.  Nevertheless, 
IMU could somehow manage to initiate punitive campaigns in the Ferghana Valley 
in 1999, 2000 and 2001.55
After Al-Qaida’s attack on the U.S. on 11 September 2001, the Karimov 
government could find international assistance in its war on terrorism. Under the title 
of the American NADR (Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related 
Programs )56 Uzbekistan received considerable aid from the United States in order to 
combat terrorism. Even though there are some arguments that power of IMU was 
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almost destroyed during US-led war in Afghanistan, the organization continued to 
pose a potential threat to the security of Central Asia for two reasons. 
First, operational bases of the organization not only consisted of the lands in 
Afghanistan but also throughout the Ferghana Valley. Second, IMU now considers 
itself to be the representative of a wider group composed of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Uighur 
separatists, and Tajik and Kyrgyz Islamists, who together form the Islamic 
Movement of Central Asia.57 In addition, it is also known that Islamic Jihad Group 
and Jamaat are now operating as the splinter groups of IMU.
It is clear to everybody that activities of IMU were obvious and their 
intention was to destroy the current government of Uzbekistan. Therefore, it is very 
natural that Uzbek authorities defined this group as an enemy who has been actually 
a part of its own society and did not hesitate to counteract it. Arguments about what 
the government should do in this context commonly miss the point that it’s very hard 
for any government to secure the citizens when some of them were in purpose to 
destroy the regime. 
Event though the rise of IMU is commonly accepted as a result of the Uzbek 
state’s crackdowns on them after 1992, the transformation of their aims from the 
destruction of the Uzbek government to formation of an Islamic State in Central Asia 
proved that the nature of this organization was much more ideological than 
reactionary. If this organization was formed as a result of crackdowns by an 
individual country (Uzbekistan) then why was it attempting to widen its base of 
operations? It can be true that radicalism increases as a result of oppressive policies 
however it is also meaningless to assume that it would spontaneously vanish when 
Uzbek government makes progress in its social policies. It is clear that an 
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organization whose aim is to bring sharia to all Central Asian countries would 
increase its activities when they find a relaxed area to operate in the home country.
The Uzbek government went on to follow its strict policy against any kind of 
activities, which had the potential to foster radical Islamism. The Ekremiye group 
was, in this context, one of the social factions, which the Uzbek government 
perceived as a threat to the secular state.
2.1.5. The Ekremiye Movement
Although the state’s authorities surely defined Ekremiye as an extremist 
Islamic organization, nature of the group has been very controversial. While scholars 
like Akiner, Husnuddinov and Babadjanov have argued that Ekremiye is a radical 
Islamic organization; people who were accused of being associated with the 
Ekremiye Movement insisted on that such an organization does not even exist.58
After Andican Uprising on 12-13 May 2005, attention has focused on the Ekremiye
movement, which was surely a brand new fraction to most.
Local experts have presented some important points to support their claim 
that Ekremiye is an Islamic organization whose aim is to replace the current regime 
of current government with an Islamic state. First point considered by Uzbek 
scholars is about the individual background of Ekrem Yuldashev, founder of the 
movement and father of the ideology shared by the members of this community.
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2.1.5.1. Leadership of The Ekremiye Group
Ekrem Yuldashev was born in 1963. After serving in the Soviet army he was 
selected as candidate for the party membership in the Communist Party of 
Uzbekistan. However, in 1991 he chose instead to become a member of Islamic party 
Hizb ut-Tahrir. In the following year he left the organization and declared he was to 
found his own group. It is ironic that while local experts who see the group as an 
Islamic radical organization point out that Ekrem Yuldashev was formerly a member 
of Hizb ut-Tahrir once and developed his first ideas here59 accused members of this 
community stressed on his pacifist character by indicating that Yuldashev left the 
group just because “he dismissed the call for an Islamic State”60 and contradicted 
with the operational methods of Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
Ekrem Yuldashev was jailed on the charges of forming an illegal 
organization. He was released in 1994 due to the lack of evidence. Government 
detected his group’s ongoing activities and Yuldashev was arrested again in 1999. It 
was decided that his prison term would be nine and a half years.
Structure of the community and its activities were used as the evidences to 
accuse Yuldashev. Critical progress in the construction of sodality among 
Yuldashev’s followers started when local Andican businessman Bahrom Shakirov 
began to construct a business community, which would operate in accordance with 
the ideas of Yuldashev. In this framework Shakirov donated a large tract of land in 
Andican’s Bogi Shamol town with the aim of providing a base for followers of 
Yuldashev’s teaching to develop a local Islamic economy. 
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2.1.5.2. Organizational Structure of the Group IMU 
From 1993 to 2005, “as many as 10 enterprises eventually opened on 
Shakirov's land, Yuldashev said, including a bakery, a hair salon, a cafeteria and a 
shoe factory. All the owners agreed to contribute a fifth of their profits to a charitable 
fund.”61
With the assistance from this fund, followers of Yuldashev could afford to 
promote studies on Islamic education. Their effort to popularize Yuldashev’s 
personal interpretation of Islamic principles was identified by government as an 
illegal movement in violation of the state control on religious education. (Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations of 1991 required all religious 
activities and institution to be registered by state authorities.)62
  Information on the group’s organizational structure can only be obtained 
from the investigations of a professional team assembled by the public prosecutor of 
Uzbekistan in 2005. At the conference of Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace on 2 May 2006, a member of this expert group, Bakhtiyar Babadjanov stated 
that;
Trusted members of the organization (Itoatchilar – “subordinates”) searched 
for appropriate candidates to fill vacancies. These candidates (Yollanma 
ishchilar – “hired”) would go through a number of preliminary interviews 
and be offered lump-sum financial assistance. Then, should an Yollanma 
ishchilar seem to be inclined to adopt the ideas of the organization and pass 
vigorous background checks, he became an Itoatchi - a regular member of the 
organization. Inside an enterprise, workers were divided into khalka (“cells”) 
of 3 to 7 people, led by Peshqadamlar (“leaders”). The Hos moddiy ma'su 
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(“supervisor”) was in charge of production, while the Hos ruhiy ma'sul 
(“supervising religious leader”) was responsible for ideology.63
2.1.5.3. The Ideology of the Ekremiye Group IMU
At this point it is very important to understand the ideology and nature of this 
seemingly commercial organization.  “Yimonga Yu” [İmana Yol in Turkish]- “Road 
to faith” written by Ekrem Yuldashev and the alleged supplement of this text which 
clearly defines the stages of an Islamic revolution are the most important sources, 
which reveal ideological motives of the group. There is no evidence that any 
adherent of Yuldashev’s “Yimonga Yul” raised political demand for an Islamic State. 
Nevertheless, according to local experts and the Uzbek government, the 
principles laid out in these texts functioned as a guide for an Islamic revolution and 
followers of Yuldashev’s teaching would ultimately come into action when the 
conditions become ripe. Government officials also used this supplement64 to support 
the view that Ekremiye is an Islamic organization and has certain objectives
At a speech in 1999 Yuldahshev himself said that “Having written a religious 
book, I wanted to call people to the truth and kindness to each other.”65 However it 
was obvious from prior developments that this call had eventually led to the 
formation of an organized group.   
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Zuhriddin Husnuddinov, rector of Tashkent University and  a special advisor 
to Karimov on spiritual issues from 2001 to 200566 translated and interpreted five 
stages of “ Yimonga Yul ” as follows: 
“Stage 1 “Sirli” (secret), the goal of which is the recruiting of new members 
of the movement; 
Stage 2 “Moddii” (material), directing the accumulation of the movement’s 
financial potential; 
Stage 3 “Ma’navii” (moral-spiritual), the goal of which is the indoctrination 
of the movement’s members; 
Stage 4 “Uzvii maidon” (organic union), the essence of which is the 
infiltration into state institutions; 
Stage 5  “Tuntarish” (translated as violent coup d'état), the final point of 
which is the establishment of a new state order based on Shariat, beginning at 
a local, followed by the central level.”67
 These objectives in the text seem to be very similar to methods of Hizb ut-
Tahrir which is available on the official website of the organization. The operational 
method of the HT consists of three stages. The first stage reveals the importance of 
cultivating people to generate the idea, the second stage requires educated people to 
interact with the Ummah (worldwide Muslim community) and form an organized 
group; and third stage foresees the seizure of political power; the establishment and 
the employment of the ideology through Ummah.68  These stages also seem to be 
compatible with some of the stages in “Road to Faith.” Such as,  Sirli: accumulation 
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of new members, Uzvii maidon: penetration into state institutions and Tuntarish: 
formation of an Islamic government evoke the methods of Hizb ut-Tahrir.69
 While Husnuddinov translated the fifth stage as a violent coup d’etat, 
Bakhtiyar Babadjanov interpreted it as “Akhirat”70 (outcome), which means an 
evolutionary progression and does not necessarily require any violent use of force to 
change the current regime. Even though Uzbek scholars have interpreted the nature 
of movement differently it was their common view that Yuldashev’s ideas would 
ultimately lead a regime change in favor of an Islamic state. From this point of view, 
it can be assumed that no matter the nature of movement was evolutionary or 
revolutionary, what scared government was ultimate change of the current regime.
 Relatives of the accused businessmen claimed that Uzbek authorities 
fabricated the supplement to Yuldashev’s Yimonga Yul in order to justify their 
position on the eyes of international media. However, First Deputy Prosecutor 
General of the Republic of Uzbekistan Anvar Nabiev denied these claims.71
Although the author of this supplement is not known, it strengthened the idea that 
there is a strong similarity between Ekremiye and Hizb ut-Tahrir.
 Even though the authenticity of this last document is debatable, the existence 
of “a group” consciousness is obvious. Although nature of the group may not be 
revolutionary, it nevertheless poses “a potential” threat to the secular character of the 
state. It is evidently seen that followers of Yuldashev applied spiritual principles in 
commercial activities; this kind of activities impacted on social life of group 
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members and it was enough for Karimov to determine that Ekremiye is a part of “a 
religious threat” in Uzbekistan. 
Public support to the group has the potential to turn this social network to a 
political faction, which shall possibly claim power in a democratic system. Karimov 
expressed his concerns on the religious activities by stating that, "Attempts to 
artificially implant democratic processes in Uzbekistan can lead to third forces 
making use of the situation. These third forces are Islamic fundamentalists."72  
 The precautionary policies of Karimov government to eliminate this 
possibility should be evaluated in this context.  From this perspective, discrimination 
between moderate Islamists and radicals did not mean much to Karimov. What the 
government perceived as a threat was not only armed action but also political and 
social means that would have potential to inspire such religious activities. 
  More restrictive policies against this faction started after bombing attacks of 
July 2004. Even though Islamic Jihad Group  took the responsibility for the attacks,73
the government continued to be more careful on possible formation of any other 
religious organization.
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC FACTORS BEHIND THE UPRISING
Most of the western scholars and analysts interpreted the Andican Uprising as 
a primary result of an economic dissatisfaction of the people. Since complaints about 
poor economic conditions were voiced during the uprising, observers concluded that 
the reason for this violent event should be attributed to an economic squeeze prior to 
the uprising.
   The IMF had reported the economic condition of Uzbekistan as very 
prosperous. According to IMF reports released in March 2005, GDP growth in 
Uzbekistan was approximately 7,5 percent. Although this figures indicates a 
recovery in Uzbek economy, local residents of Andican claimed, “GDP growth here 
is not improving the lives of ordinary people.”74  For many experts of the region, 
deterioration in the economic conditions of Uzbekistan and its political problems 
endangered the security and social stability.   
Structural reforms in economics are strongly needed to promote better living 
conditions in Uzbekistan but the political elite has not been  willing to accept 
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alterations that would undermine their privileged status. There are several 
explanations of why GDP growth did not increase but actually worsened the living 
standards of Uzbek citizens. Restrictive regulations related to the border trade and 
bazaars, the inability to use oil reserves, strict monetary policies and agrarian 
disturbances all together contributed to discontent in Uzbek society. 
3.1. Economics in Uzbekistan After the Collapse of the Soviet Union
Before explaining the recent implications of the general economic structure, 
which created a discontent among Uzbek citizens, the rationale of the government 
behind its economic policies and phases of economic transition after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union should be explored. This facilitates an understanding of the 
microeconomic implications of the Uzbekistan’s destructive macroeconomic policies 
for small sized entrepreneurs and the greater part of the population.
In the Soviet system, almost all the republics were dependent upon each other 
in terms of the flow of raw materials. After the collapse of the Soviet former 
republics that had previously been designated by the central government as suppliers 
of raw materials were left with little or no production capacity for consumer goods. 
Moreover, each republic had been obliged to focus on the supply of a specific 
commodity. This structure left former Soviet republics vulnerable to the economic 
deficiencies. 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union Uzbekistan “ran a trade deficit in 
consumption goods, machinery and fuel, and ran a trade surplus in agricultural 
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production and light industry.”75 Especially the cotton production  alone accounted 
for 2/3 of the GDP in Uzbekistan before the collapse.76  Uzbekistan imported oil and 
energy required for almost all of its consumption despite the existence of “estimated 
gas reserves of more than 1 trillion cubic meters it produced more than 10 per cent of 
the union’s natural gas in the 1980s.”77
3.1.1. Financial Goals of the Uzbek Administration after Independence  
Within this inherently interdependent structure Karimov identified his goal as 
the construction of a self-sufficient economy that would reduce the negative effects 
of economic stagnation in other former republics. Although there was no officially 
planned schedule for the transition period, it was obvious that ruling elite would 
apply to the centralized state control in the first years of the transition to market 
economy.78
“During the initial years of transition, the country had to spend more than US$ 1 
billion annually for the import of wheat and energy products alone, which together 
accounted for about 40 per cent of the country’s total import bill.”79  That is why the 
Uzbek government tried to achieve economic independence. Increasing the capacity 
for domestic production to decrease the dependence was the centerpiece of initial 
policies.
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The transformation from an agricultural base to industrialized one 
necessitated increasing the budget for investment in industry. In this context the rural 
sect of the population was sacrificed to the development of industry and 
consequently most of the Uzbek citizens could not take advantage of the progress in 
industrial development. Lower subsidies to farmers combined with higher utility bills 
created discontent in the society.   
In addition, the budget necessary for industrialization of the economy under 
state control was provided through strict price control over raw materials and a high 
rate of taxation on imported goods. As a result, macroeconomic success in 
Uzbekistan did not create welfare on a microeconomic scale. The economic policies 
of Uzbek government, which were conducted to decrease vulnerability and 
dependency of country,  showed mercantilist inclinations. 
 However, in the initial phases of the transition, the variety of domestically 
produced consumer goods remained limited. Moreover, the Uzbek population, most 
of which were living in rural areas and had a low level of income because of the state 
price controls80 of cotton and other targeted products, could not afford the high prices 
of imported consumption goods. 
These factors led low-income holders to obtain imported consumer goods 
illegally, which decreased the burden of high rate of taxes. Thus the amplification in 
illegal transactions became the very characteristic of the Uzbek economy. “World 
Bank statistics placed the informal sector in Uzbekistan at a modest 34% of GNP, 
however many Uzbeks would argue that the actual figure is much higher, totaling 
almost half of the private sector activity in the country.”81
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Under these conditions the Uzbek government introduced new rules for 
eliminating the unregistered economic activity in the country. However these new 
regulations could not legitimize the informal economic activities but rather tried to 
eliminate them and in so doing even increased their frequency. 
3.2. Agrarian Disturbances
Agrarian problems are one of the most important sources of social unrest in 
Uzbekistan where “65 percent of the population is rural, and 35 percent of the labor 
population is active in agriculture.”82
The most problematical feature of government’s agrarian policy was about its 
strict price controls on strategic products. Farmers were required to cultivate certain 
products the amounts of which were determined by the government. Producers who 
could not meet the quota were obliged to sell all of their goods to the government at 
the very below the market prices.
The state order system is being liberalized as the percentage of the crop that 
must be sold to the state has been reduced—down to 30% for cotton and 25% 
for grain by 1998—but these numbers are misleading. If a farm produces less 
than its target output of cotton, then the entire crop must be sold through the 
state order system.83
 Under these circumstance farmers are consequently prohibited to sell any 
part of their harvest at the market value.  State order price is very low in Uzbekistan 
when compared to the prices in neighboring countries. In 2004 state order prices for 
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cotton varied between 50,000 and 80,000 sums ($50-$80) per ton, while in 
Kyrgyzstan, prices over which farmers sold their cotton ranged from 10,000-13,000 
Kyrgyz soms ($250-$320) per ton. 84
In the case that farmers produce more than the quota, standard price which 
government mandated for given goods was applied only to the half of their total 
output. In such cases even if farmers were allowed to sell the remainder of their 
harvest at market prices, direct transactions between private entrepreneurs were still 
limited. All international trade deals are subject to the strict supervision of 
government.  
Cotton is considered as a ‘strategic good’ and the private sector is not allowed 
to buy it directly from farmers. As a corollary, cotton producers have no other 
choice than to sell their product to state owned cotton marketing chain at a 
higher than state order price, but still much lower than the world market 
price.85
Before Andican uprising, the financial implications of the government’s 
agricultural policy were more keenly felt, because of the heavy rains in the spring of 
2003. Farmers faced difficulties to meet the expected quotas of cotton.   “Cotton 
yield decreased from 3.2 million tons in 2002 to 2.85 million tons and the production 
volume of cotton fiber dropped by more than 6 percent to 945.thousand tons.”86
Consequently they had to sell all they got from the harvest to the government at the 
very low state prices and their income from the harvest decreased remarkably in this 
year.
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Another failure of the agricultural policy in the production of cotton was 
structural. “To redistribute revenue from agriculture to other sectors; and improve 
rural standards of living”87 were other goals of the government. However in practice 
these two goals contradicted with each other. High taxes on cotton production were 
collected to provide income, which was to be channeled to other sectors, but this 
process did not improve the living conditions of rural population. 
Since a higher amount of cotton production meant higher tax payments, 
farmers showed an inclination to produce not more than government quota. This also 
created an obstacle for the government to increase the production of cotton, which 
has important share in the Uzbekistan’s total export revenues. (60% of the export 
revenues in Uzbekistan come from cotton and the contribution of cotton to the 
country’s total GDP in 2000 was 12.9%)88
This reaction of farmers against high taxation accelerated the deficiency of 
the agricultural economy in Uzbekistan. The most problematic feature of this 
structure was the continuation of old fashioned kolkhoz system under the new name 
of shirkat [firm or company]. The concept of shirkat was used in Uzbekistan to 
identify cooperative agricultural entities, which are the subdivisions of older 
kolkhozes. 
These shirkats were very similar to kolkhozes because they were mainly 
determined by the state mandate on what crop was to be produced and what the 
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prices of these goods would be.89In this system shirkats function as the local 
representatives of central administration and control whether or not farmers meet the 
required quota.
Shirkat administrations have an important role in redistribution of lands and 
the collective farms to individual families.  These group farms are called private but 
no individual farmer actually owns these lands. Redistribution of these collective 
farms was a matter of land leasing. The property rights, which result from these 
contracts, are very limited. According to the leasing contracts “the shirkat
administration provides inputs (seeds and fertilizer) and buys the product”90
In addition to the restraint over property rights, corruptions of shirkat 
administration also fostered discontent among farmers.  For instance, “ the local 
administration of the region in which the shirkat is located decides applications for 
private forms in a process plagued with corruption and lack of transparency. Often 
the best lands go to former shirkat bosses.”91 Moreover, farmers had to plant most of 
the land they leased with state ordered crops. “Shirkats produce 60 percent of the 
cotton crop but most are loss making.”92 If they violated the mandate, the local 
administration had the right to interrupt the flow of water and break the lease. In such 
cases farmers were again confined to producing crops, to be sold over at low 
procurement prices leading to bankruptcy. 
State control over cotton prices was not the only cause of increasing 
dissatisfaction among Uzbek farmers, but it also was a source of tension among the 
country’s interest groups. “Controlling the procurement and export of cotton and 
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distribution channels of export proceeds was obviously source of wealth for some 
people and groups and cause of rivalry between interest groups”93 For example, 
Ismail Jurabekov, the leader of a Samarkand clan had a strong position in the country 
and the reason of that reputation was his control over the cotton business in 
Uzbekistan. This indicates that an elite group earning money over the existing 
policies also holds important positions in decision-making mechanism of the state 
and this elite group has usually been reluctant to alter status quo.
        
3.3. Financial Regulations preceding the Andican Uprising 
3.3.1. Restrictions on Access to Cash 
Restrictions on the use of cash in Uzbekistan was one of the factors, which 
led small and medium sized entrepreneurs increasingly to operate in informal sector. 
“In July 1996, a complete electronic payment clearing system was introduced by the 
Central Bank, covering whole Uzbekistan.”94 Banking regulations in Uzbekistan 
introduced strict conditions on entrepreneurs’ withdrawal of money from their own 
accounts. Permission to individuals to use their own money was subjected to the 
control of bank staff, which evaluated the limited conditions under which withdrawal 
was allowed.95 “Cash withdrawals by legal entities are only permitted for payment of 
wages and travel expenses. Cash receipts must be deposited on the same day are 
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received.”96 Therefore this regulation put the unregistered entities out of business 
space. Not only were commercial activities in the country were restricted by this 
legislation but social ones were as well. Only verified, non-governmental 
organizations could operate within the country, consequently the independent 
formation of a civil society was restricted by limitations on the circulation of cash.
3.3.1.1. Role of IMF in the Restriction of Access to Cash
In 2002, the Uzbek government made a new agreement with the IMF and 
adopted a unified foreign exchange regime. This agreement meant that the liberation 
of Uzbek financial system would begin.  The government consequently agreed to 
abolish the limitations on cash withdrawal, restrictive banking regulations, and credit 
policy. In order to keep its promises the government of Uzbekistan tried to decrease 
the supply of foreign currency available to unregistered economic activities.
Demand was reduced by putting tough constraints on the “consumers,” which 
are predominantly small businesses (including so called “shuttle traders”) that 
did not have access to official sources of foreign exchange. The supply of 
foreign exchange was encouraged by creating a shortage of local currency 
(through delays in wage payments) forcing the population to exchange their 
foreign currency cash savings to pay for everyday expenses.97
The Uzbek government required local administrators and commercial banks 
to increase their control of cash circulation in order to stop the continuous 
devaluation of the Uzbek currency. The increase of the National Bank of 
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Uzbekistan’s cash assets from 2.717 billion Uzs to 3.265 billion Uzs proved that 
monetary policies of the government were successful in macroeconomic terms.98
3.3.1.2. Social Implications of the Restriction 
Although macroeconomic successes were attained in the country, discontent 
over government’s financial policies increased among individual firms, traders and 
ordinary citizens because of the following reasons.  
First, the new rule about the circulation of cash also raised fines for 
companies that could not deposit their cash receipts in a bank.  Their unwillingness 
was primarily due to the long process of withdrawal and restrictions on access to 
cash, as a consequence of which officially registered companies suffered, and the 
number of small enterprises that operated in the informal sector increased.
Second, as a requirement of the law in force, all transactions between private 
firms in Uzbekistan had to be conducted through bank accounts. However, due to the 
shortage of cash in the country, Uzbek traders suffered from delays in cash delivery, 
which caused problems especially when cash flow is strongly required in order to 
complete the production of the goods ordered. Delays in the delivery of cash caused 
breakdowns in rural areas, too. Farmers who could not withdraw their returns from 
banks in a timely manner could not pay workers’ wages. Consequently the negative 
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effects of restriction on cash circulation extended to the daily lives of the rural 
population.99
Third, on 24 September 2004 the Uzbek government decreed that “retail 
spaces larger than 150 square meters, would be issued licenses only if they had the 
capability to handle [credit] card transactions.”100 This decree was issued in order to 
decrease the use of cash in Uzbekistan, and to change the increasingly informal 
nature of the economy. The government’s efforts at making a rapid transition, 
however, failed to realize that the bulk of citizens in the country were operating in 
bazaars and still using cash for retail purchases. 
These regulations left small sized entrepreneurs whose capital was 
insufficient to open registered stores without the chance to obtain a license for trade. 
These conditions consequently provided them no other alternatives than to choose 
between resistance against the government or withdrawal from commerce. This 
problem, combined with a loss of public confidence towards the banks, caused great 
discontent both in the business sector and among the ordinary people of 
Uzbekistan.101
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3.3.2. Regulations on Border Security and Customs
Certification problem and corruption of customs officers remain as two 
important problems for traders in Uzbekistan. Imported goods are required to have 
bear certifications and excessive customs documents consisting of a contract, a 
certification of conformity (in the case of certain products), a certificate of origin, the 
passport of an import deal signed by importer’s bank and a customs officer. All 
imported goods must be labeled in Uzbek and include veterinary certificates. 
The point was actually not the number of documents but arbitrary control of 
customs officers over them. Border controls were increased, in addition to the 
practice of using debits cards, which was applied in order to decrease the scope of 
unregistered economy.  
Border controls were consequently increased. “In January 2003, customs 
administration began to impose harsh measurement on goods crossing borders.”102
However this control policy could not succeed because of the increasing corruption 
on involving border controls. Many entrepreneurs reported that these officers used 
their authority to derive improper personal benefit. They had right to confiscate and 
to sell the goods that lacked the necessary documentation. It became a habit for 
customs officers to take bribes in return of their approval to imported goods.
On May 2003 Uzbek government issued a decree, which “introduced new 
customs tariffs for goods imported by private persons (mostly shuttle traders) in the 
amount of 50 percent for food items and industrial equipment and in the amount of 
90 percent for other goods”103 While increasing the burden on individual 
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entrepreneurs whose capital was not sufficient to found a registered company, the tax 
rate applied to the larger company owners was reduced from 40-45 % to 30 %.104
One can infer from this data that high rate of taxes on customs for shuttle traders 
contributed to the success of the government’s macroeconomic policies, which 
clearly benefited registered formally registered companies. 
            However, the extent to which lower income earners benefited from this 
success is an open question. The government implemented strict customs controls in 
order to control the illegal shuttle trade; but this policy added a new twist to the 
problems of small-scale traders who also suffered from unofficial burden of bribery.
3.3.3. New Rules for Sellers in Bazaars 
Contrary to the expected results, the Uzbek government’s policies on 
domestic economy caused the growth of the activities of the informal economy, and 
increased the number of people who earned money from black market. The illegal 
shuttle trade allowed low capital businesses to import cheap goods from China. 
Kyrgyzstan played a crucial role in promoting a base for the black market operation. 
A bazaar located in the Kara Su town near the Osh City in Kyrgyzstan territory was 
used by Uzbek entrepreneurs and wholesalers as the center for their transactions.105
As a result of this economical structure, domestic trade was also concentrated in the 
local bazaars where local traders could sell the commodities they obtained over the 
Kyrgyz border. 
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But in June 2003, Uzbek Government officials issued an ordinance, decree 
1150, according to which “clothes and other goods would have to be sold in shops or 
closed stands, to be built at markets for $3,000 to $5,000, a price few traders could 
afford”.106  After all these warning signs, the government began to implement its 
decision to eliminate the local bazaars. In 2004 officials decided to destroy most of 
these bazaars in order to construct legal business venues, to control the quality of 
imported goods, and to decrease the share of unregistered activities within the Uzbek 
economy. “On 10 September 2004, on orders of mayor, Saydullo Begaliyev, 
government bulldozers began demolishing some 600 trading booths near Andijon’s 
congregational mosque.”107
Ghani Rustamov, Deputy Governor of Fergana Province, stated on 23 
December 2004 that, 
Our goal is to put imported goods under control, because many imports do 
not have certificates, and can be dangerous for health. With some of the 
clothes people are bringing from China, if you light a match near them, they'll 
go up in flames or cause allergies. Those who import must answer for safety 
and cleanliness of their goods. They need to have legal status and legal 
accountability. Yes, we are charging higher import duties for individual 
traders than for legal entities. Why? Our goal is to encourage people to 
become legal entities with greater accountability. If someone can afford to act 
as an individual trader, fine, let him pay. We've been explaining this on 
television since September, but there were some misunderstandings.108
However the real factor behind these policies was the government’s fear of an 
outflow of currency. As a necessity of structural integration program of the IMF, the 
Uzbek Sum became convertible to foreign currencies after 2001.109 Under these 
conditions, restrictions other than import tariffs were needed by government to 
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control the rate of import and to promote the use of currency for domestic 
production.   
Therefore, combined with restriction on access to cash and strict controls on 
borders, new constraints on import for small and medium sized entrepreneurs who 
mainly operated in bazaars were introduced. The destruction of local bazaars formed 
only one component of this macroeconomic policy but resulted in an increase of 
unemployment rates and social unrest. By 2000, the contribution of small and 
medium sized enterprises to employment in Uzbekistan was approximately 50%.110
With these new rules relating to the bazaars, the hidden rate of unemployment 
increased, especially around rural Andican where residents now could no longer 
trade at the Karasu Bazaar and cross the border to Osh in order to trade for a higher 
profit. As a corollary of these restrictive government regulations, tensions between 
the government and Uzbek society increased.
3.4. Gas and Oil Shortages 
Gas and petrol shortages in Uzbekistan were one of the most significant 
economic difficulties, which Uzbek citizens had to face prior to the Andican 
Uprising. The global increase on oil prices may have been one of the most 
conspicuous reasons for the shortage but the government monopoly in the oil 
industry was another factor affecting the local supply of gas and oil. 
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Self-sufficiency project of the government in the petroleum industry proved 
to be unattainable. According to Uzbek experts, “New technology could boost 
production, they say, but instead, cost-cutting and poor management have led to the 
rapid exhaustion of oil fields.”111 During the cold winter of 2004 Uzbek citizens had 
attempted to demonstrate their anger at electricity cuts and gas shortages to the 
authorities. 
“On 1 December 2004, in the Andican province village of Marhamat, some 
300 people, angered at electricity cuts, blocked the Osh- Fergana highway and hurled 
stones at passing cars. A vehicle of the regional electric department was also 
attacked.”112 Daily problems of the people in the context of these shortages also 
contributed to dissatisfaction expressed in the Andican Uprising.
It is clear from the above account that Uzbek officials aimed to decrease the 
share of unregistered activities in the economy. Uzbek government officials thought 
that Uzbekistan could improve its economy only by restricting import and promoting 
local production. In 2002 the Uzbek government had placed 70% tax on imported 
goods and tried to increase the extent of domestic production under state control.
The government also decreed legal regulations in order to control informal 
trade. Strict monetary policy was implemented and some controls on taxation, 
licensing, certification and payment were made. However these regulations created 
difficulty for small and medium sized entrepreneurs in the country and caused the 
emergence of a system, which would allow only an elite class to participate into the 
business sector and to benefit from.
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From this perspective the problem between public and the administration 
seems to be stemming from contradictory relationship between the macroeconomic 
goals of the Uzbek government and general characteristics of small and medium 
sized business sector in the country. 
It would be natural for any transitional economy for long run macroeconomic 
prosperity to be attained at the expense of short-term individual assets. However in 
the Uzbek case what dramatically decreased the social stability, was that forfeit of 
the economic policies had to be paid by the lower income earners of the society 
while an elite group strengthened its advantageous position. As a result, tension 
between this elite group and lower income earners increased year over year.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF REGIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND 
DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE UPRISING
In addition to the increasing activities of fundamentalist groups, regional 
conjuncture also affected the government perspective regarding the Ekremiye group. 
U.S. support to moderate Islam in Central Asia113 and the colored revolutions in 
neighboring countries were other factors, which led Karimov to assume that religious 
groups in the country had a considerable potential to change the government. 
Some experts charge that President Bush bears some responsibility for raising the 
expectations of people in places like Uzbekistan. In a speech given to crowds in 
Georgia just three days before the Andijon uprising, Mr. Bush called for the 
expansion of freedom throughout the region. "Now, across the Caucasus, in Central 
Asia, and in the broader Middle East, we see the same desire for liberty burning in 
the hearts of young people. They are demanding their freedom - and they will have 
it," Bush said.114
Hill and Jones have argued that “Karimov saw Andijan as a clear sign that 
Uzbekistan was now infected with the contagion of revolt from Colored Revolution. 
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”115 From this perspective, Karimov believed that these revolutionary movements in 
Central Asian countries stemmed from their domestic problems but were provoked 
by the U.S. which wished to raise allied governments and to strengthen its hand in 
opposition to the Russia’s regional dominance.  
4.1. United States –Uzbekistan Relations before the Andican Uprising
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan turned its face toward the 
west in order to distance from the Russia’s sphere of influence.  The Uzbek 
government was clearly aware that the economic assistance needed for its transition 
could only be provided by the American financial institutions. 
U.S. was also keen to construct good relations with Central Asian countries 
including Uzbekistan, because of the following reasons. First, the United States of 
America wanted to provide balance of power with Russia and China; in this context, 
as the closest region to both, Central Asia had considerable significance.  The 
Caspian basin’s116 potential and proven 360 trillion cubic feet gas and 140 billion 
barrels oil reserves 117 were an important reason of why the U.S. wanted to increase 
its influence in Central Asia against Russia. On 22 July 1997 U.S. senate Martha 
Brill Olcott had told that 
It is Central Asia’s wealth of course, which has sparked the American interest 
in the region. While U.S. policy-makers certainly do not want to see a 
hegemonic Russia for general geopolitical reasons, the potential costs of such 
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hegemony become far greater if Russia is able to dictate the terms and limit 
western access to the world’s last known vast oil and gas reserves.118
 US concerns about Taliban regime in Afghanistan were another major factor 
in developing its relations with Uzbekistan before 2001.  Rustam Jumaev, chief 
spokesman for Uzbek president Islam Karimov, declared on 14 October 2001 that  
“In 1998, after terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
President Bill Clinton signed a secret intelligence "finding" authorizing the CIA to 
use covert means to disrupt and preempt bin Laden's operations.”119 This secret 
alliance also included the training of Uzbek soldiers by American experts.
 The threat of Islamic militancy in the region and the operations of Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan also led the U.S. and Uzbekistan to cooperate in security 
issues. In January 2001, Uzbekistan and the United States declared their joint 
policies and signed a declaration promising a common action against natural and 
human made crises.120   In April 2001 John Beyrle, acting advisor to the United 
States secretary on newly independent states visited Tashkent in order to strengthen 
the mutual cooperation against terrorism and described Uzbekistan as a trustworthy 
colleague and donated new night vision goggles to be utilized at Uzbek borders.121
 Although the U.S. desired to derive economic benefits from the region and 
take steps against religious militancy, problems with democratization and poor 
human rights record of Uzbek government became the concerns in the U.S. approach 
towards Uzbekistan. However, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon, the U.S. shaded its 
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democratization concerns and brought the “war on terrorism” to the top of the U.S. 
foreign policy agenda. In the context of this initiative, Central Asia especially 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, gained a strategic importance because of their 
geographical proximity to Afghanistan, the homeland of the terrorist Al-Qaida
organization which was deemed for the 9/11 attacks. In addition, the U.S. was also 
concerned that the Afghan threat could diffuse into all of the Central Asia. 
Thus concerns of the U.S. with respect to democratization in Uzbekistan were 
put aside for a while in order to guarantee a military base in its war against the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  On 7 October 2001, Uzbekistan offered the Kharshi 
Khanabad (K2) airbase to the United States. Within the Status of Forces Agreement, 
the K2 airbase, which is 90 miles away from Afghanistan, was officially opened to 
the U.S. forces. “Although the exact size of the U.S. at the K2 base was never 
officially disclosed, it was estimated to have approximately 1.750 military personnel 
and 20 C-130 transport aircraft.”122
On 12 March 2002, the United States–Uzbekistan Declaration on the 
Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework was confirmed by Secretary of 
State Colin Powell and Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov.123 With this 
declaration of strategic partnership the security collaboration between two was 
formalized. 
The Uzbek Government also promised to take action to achieve “democratic 
reforms in priority areas such as building a strong and open civil society, establishing 
a genuine multi-party system and independence of the media, strengthening non-
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governmental structures, and improving the judicial system.”124 In return, during the 
U.S. Campaign in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2003 the annual aid Uzbekistan 
received from U.S. increased from $83.2 to $171.65 million.125 However despite the 
promises it made, Uzbekistan’s democracy scores worsened and human rights 
continued to be violated. The results of the “Democracy Report” prepared by 
Freedom House in 2008 (see Table I, below), shows that Uzbek Government 
achieved none of the promises mentioned above. 126
Table I. Uzbekistan Democracy Score 
Democracy Score of Uzbekistan by Freedom House 127 (1 represents the highest level of      
democratic progress and 7 the lowest)
According to Alexander Cooley, professor of political science at Columbia 
University, the Uzbek government took advantage of the international situation to 
gain economic benefit. In order to obtain financial assistance for it’s anti terrorism 
efforts, Uzbekistan exaggerated the degree of religious fundamentalism the country 
                                                
124 US Department of State, Fact Sheet “United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic 
Partnership and Cooperation Framework”  http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8736.htm
(July 14, 2008)
125US Department of State Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the United States 
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http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ace/, (April 20, 2007)
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1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Electoral Process 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00
Civil Society 6.50 6.50 6.75 6.50 6.50 6.50 7.00 7.00 7.00
Independent media 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 7.00 7.00
Governance 6.25 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.25 n/a n/a n/a n/a
National democratic 
Governance
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.50 7.00 7.00 7.00
Local Democratic 
Governance
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75
Judicial Framework and 
Independence
6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75
Corruption 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.50 6.50 6.50
Democracy Score 6.38 6.42 6.46 6.46 6.46 6.43 6.82 6.82 6.86
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was facing. At the same time it also suppressed dissidents in the country by 
demonizing religious sentiments.128
Until 2003, the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan was a 
matter of a dichotomy between security concerns and promotion of democracy. 
“State Department and Pentagon worked at cross-purposes. When the former reduced 
aid due to human rights violations, the latter increased funding for military 
assistance.”129 However the U.S. administration did not continue to ignore the human 
rights violations in Uzbekistan so as to be consistent within its foreign policy agenda 
after 2003. The reconsideration of democratic concerns in U.S. foreign policy was 
prompted by its invasion of Iraq in 2003.  The U.S. entered Iraq to take pre-emptive 
action against the alleged threat posed by weapons of mass destruction possessed by 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. President Bush also justified U.S. presence in Iraq by 
claiming that the liberation of Iraq from the authoritarian regime of Saddam and 
promotion of democracy could be effected only by a global power like U.S. 
Ostensibly the global promotion of democracy became one of the most important 
motives of the U.S. foreign policy after 2003 and ever since that time the United 
States’ approach towards Uzbekistan was shaped in accordance with this policy. As a 
result, “due to Uzbekistan’s poor human right record the freezing of US aid to 
Uzbekistan was prompted by Congress’ insertion of human rights baselines into the 
2004 Foreign Operations Act.”130
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After the suspension of financial aid, relation between the U.S. and 
Uzbekistan worsened.  Emergence of the colored revolutions in the former Soviet 
Union republics led Karimov to believe that the United States of America was trying 
to increase its maneuverability by way of promoting democratic revolutions, which 
would foster allied governments in the region.
4.2. Colored Revolutions 
The transitional economies of post-Soviet countries experienced tough times 
and the economic problems of these countries led to public grievances resulting in 
revolutions. In November 2003 Eduard Shevardnadze was toppled by the Rose 
Revolution in Georgia; Viktor Yuschenko in Ukrain came to power through the 
Orange Revolution in December 2004 and finally public protests in Kyrgyztsan 
resulted in the abdication of President Askar Akayev, in March 2005, two months 
before Andican Uprising. 
Local civil society and ordinary citizens who suffered economic problems 
contributed to the formation of these revolutions and they intended to replace their 
authoritarian regimes with more liberal and democratic ones. Domestic problems 
were shown to be the primary inspiration of these movements.
Mark Beissinger who studied on common features of democratic revolutions 
reached the conclusion that lack of suppressive response to protests was a critical 
factor enabled the opposition groups to turn out the present governments.131
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According to him neither the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan nor the Rose 
Revolution in Georgia were strong enough to succeed. For Beissinger, if the 
governments of these countries had responded aggressively to protests, these 
uprisings would have been prevented from having revolutionary effects. Therefore, 
Karimov’s harsh response to Andican Uprising was vital for his regime’s survival.
Prima facie, there was no trace of foreign inducement to revolution other than 
international support of the formation of democratic institutions and of a civil society 
in these countries.132 In the form of financial assistance to non-governmental 
organizations this support was reported to have no offence on current regimes133
However, Karimov after 13 May 2005 continuously stressed that the Andican 
Uprising like Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan and Rose revolution in Georgia was 
organized by civil society organizations supported by foreign countries. Beissinger 
identified the existence of nongovernmental organizations and western support to 
dissidents in post-Soviet countries as a factor, which accelerated democratic 
revolutions. 134
Karimov also claimed that the interests of the United States had a 
determinative role in the formation of the colored revolutions. He also viewed the 
Andican Uprising as the continuation of the democratic revolutions the United States 
fueled by taking advantage of the problems of state building in post-Soviet 
countries.135
Points that might be relevant to US interest in government changes of Central 
Asian countries should be indicated in order to examine to what extent Karimov may 
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be right in his claims. Now lets see the common motives and problematical issues, 
which increased social discontent in these countries. Commonalities that facilitated 
the mobilization of mass movements in these cases should also be indicated to see 
whether or not the colored revolutions were inspired by the strategic concerns of the 
United States and enabled by its financial support.
4.2.1. Rose Revolution in Georgia  
Eduard Shevardnadze became the president of Georgia in 1993. Although he 
was the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party he turned towards the west 
following independence. Russia continued to use economic and military means to 
maintain its influence over Georgia taking advantage of its strategic position. 
Russian military bases in Georgia were the fundamental to Russian interests. “The 
Treaty on Russian Military Bases on the Territory of the Republic of Georgia granted 
Russia access to four bases in Georgia for duration of at least 25 years.”136  Although 
Russian bases were closed later, this treaty was an indication of Russian influence in 
Georgia at that time.
Meanwhile, Shevardnadze established close relations with the United States 
in the process of democratizing his country. To counter Russian influence was 
another motive in the development of relations with the U.S. Shevardnadze received 
over $700 million of American direct aid until 2000.137 After 11 September 2001, 
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nations of the Southern Caucasus including Georgia received $64 million US 
military aid.
Like the situation in Andican in 2005, Georgia was suffering from poor socio 
economic conditions, including electricity and water shortages, and “more than half 
of the population were living below the poverty line”138 Under these conditions it 
seemed difficult for Shevardnadze supported party, Citizens’ Union of Georgia, to 
win the parliamentary election held in November 2003. Mikhail Saakashvili, 
Georgian Minister of Justice between 2000-2001, participated in the elections with 
his party, the New National Movement. At the outcome of the 2 November 2003
election, Shevardnadze supported party was announced as the victor. Observers 
reported fraud in election process. “The International Society for Fair Elections and 
Democracy, a Georgian election monitoring organization, conducted a parallel vote 
and turnout tabulation—a large, statistically valid sample of turnout and results.  
According to this source, Saakashvili’s National Movement was the election’s clear 
winner.”139
After these events, people, numbering between 500 and 5000, gathered in 
front of the Georgian parliament and protested the results, demanding the resignation 
of President Shevardnadze. After ten days, the number of protesters reached 20.000. 
Shevardnadze wanted to suppress the protests by force, however, internal discord 
between police forces and the administration prevented Shevardnadze from ending 
the movement. It ultimately resulted in the collapse of his government.  
During this period in Georgia, traces of an authoritarian regime were still 
apparent. Although corruption in political life continued and liberties were still 
limited, NGOs funded by foreign assistance worked to improve the civil society. 
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Contrary to the situation in Uzbekistan, in Georgia civil society have found the 
opportunity to mobilize and improve under the semi authoritarian regime of 
Shevardnadze.  Scholars such as Jones, King, Carothers and Mitchell claim that it 
was Georgian civil society, which overthrew the government in November 2003. 
According to Mitchell,
Georgian civil society directly benefited from Serbian NGOs’ anti- Milosevic 
experience. At least in part, the November 2003 events were possible because 
a number of prominent NGOs such as the Liberty Institute were trained in the 
methods and tactics of non-violent political opposition to authoritarian 
leaders by Serbian NGOs. George Soros’s Open Society Institute (OSI) 
played a major role in financing not only the general development of 
Georgian NGOs but also civic actions, which directly contributed to 
Shevardnadze’s fall.140
From general information about the conditions in Georgia before November 
2003 it is clear that the U.S. had already good relations with the Georgian 
government prior to the revolt. It was not necessary to encourage a revolution for the 
purpose of raising an allied government against Russian dominance. Georgia’s 
relations with Russia were already in decline and Russia had withdrawn from its 
military bases in Georgia. However, it should not be denied that non-governmental 
organizations funded by foreign countries facilitated the necessary means to realize 
the regime change. Nevertheless, this does not automatically prove that such aid was 
donated to civil society organizations in a systematic way replacing the government. 
Georgian society’s discontent due to the poor socio economic conditions and the 
expression of this unrest was inflamed by government fraud in the parliamentary 
elections. Thus the protests appeared to be formed spontaneously by civil groups 
who insisted on resisting the continuous corruption in the country.  
Although the United States’ interests in Georgia were clear, there is no 
evidence that Rose Revolution resulted from the United States’ strategic plan in the 
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region. The Georgian case thus does not support Karimov’s claim that Andican was 
part of a broader U.S. plan for promoting democratic revolutions.
.
4.2.2. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine 
The pre-revolutionary period in Ukraine was not much different from that in 
Georgia. Leonid Kuchma had been elected as president in 1994 and since then he 
ruled the country in a semi-authoritarian fashion. In 1996 he approved a new 
constitution for Ukraine. By amendments in the constitution, the president was given 
greater authority, to act without restriction during his period in office. Kuchma 
started to use this power to strengthen his position in the country and suppressed the 
opposition groups.  
The problems of the Kuchma regime were not limited to his individual 
leadership. His supporters were nominated as deputies of the new regime and very 
soon an oligarchy was formed. Most of the deputies were also active in the business 
sector. “386 of 450 deputies in parliament were founders of 3954 business”141 and 
bulk of the export and import transaction in Ukraine was being controlled by them. 
Economic power was concentrated in the hands of this ruling elite and most of them 
were accused of abusing their authority to gain improper advantage in their business 
activities.142 Corruption in business sector was widened by arbitrary sanctions 
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imposed on the individual shuttle traders who helped opposition groups in the 
country.143
The government’s strict control of the media was another dimension of the 
authoritarian nature of Kuchma’s regime. Journalists who criticized the 
government’s policies were daunted with attacks. The murder of journalist Georgi 
Gongadze was a critical point in the mobilization of opposition groups.144 Rumors 
that the president ordered his execution increased social frustration and led to a large-
scale public protests. These protests later merged with the political opposition whose 
leaders were former oligarchs in Kuchma’s governments. The rightist Yushchenko, 
socialist Moros and leftist Tymoshenko all voiced their opposition to 
Kuchma’scorrupt policies.
In the 2004 presidential elections, Yushchenko announced his candidacy 
against the former Prime Minister, Yanukovych who was supported by Kuchma. In 
the first round of the 2004 presidential elections Yushchenko recieved 39.9 % of 
votes while Yanukovych received 39.3 %. Experts expected that Yushchenko would 
be the victor. However, Yanukovych was declared the winner of the election with 
49.5 % of the votes.  Election fraud was reported and on 22 November 2004, 
between 100.000 and 300.000 Ukrainians participated in a mass protest to condemn 
the election results. The government tried to suppress the protest by force on 28 
November but the scale of the crowd made it impossible to do so.145  With the 
increasing protests and foreign criticisms, Kuchma decided to renew the elections on 
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3 December between the two candidates Yushchenko and Yanukovych. On 26 
December 52 % of the votes was accounted for Yushchenko.146  
After protests led to regime change in Ukraine, the international community 
increasingly focused on the possibility of a chain reaction against authoritarian 
regimes in post-Soviet countries. From this perspective, the United States’ leading 
role in the promotion of democracy was seen as a significant factor, which might 
have been effective in the formation of Orange Revolution. Ukraine’s fragile 
relations with the U.S. before the Orange Revolution also supported this 
presumption.  In 2002 Ukraine had sold advanced radars system to Iraq and the 
subsequent reaction of the U.S. administration worsened the relations between the 
two countries.147 President Bush suggested that Ukraine might become
internationally isolated and indicated that the sale could result in a suspension of 
financial assistance. Moreover, the U.S. perceived Ukraine’s improving relations 
with Russia as a threat to its interests in the region.148  “Ukraine is a strategic 
battleground in this geopolitical tug-of-war between Washington and Moscow. 
Ukrainian pipeline routes account for 75% of EU oil imports from Russia and 
Central Asia, and 34% of its natural gas import.”149
US aid to Ukrainian civil society150 formation strengthened the suspects on its 
involvement to formation of opposition movements.  Three civil society foundations 
funded by the U.S. government were involved the protests.
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The National Endowment for Democracy, which receives its money directly 
from Congress; the Eurasia Foundation, which receives money from the State 
Department, and the Renaissance Foundation, part of a network of charities 
funded by billionaire George Soros that receives money from the State 
Department.151
Ukraine’s record on democratization was quite poor before the Orange 
Revolution. The suppressive character of the government combined with foreign aid 
to civil society in Ukraine led to the Orange Revolution resulting in regime change. 
The deterioration in relations with the U.S. before the revolution in 2004 reinforced 
the argument that U.S. aid was used to support the opposition groups and to replace 
the regime with one that would serve to U.S. interests. Thus the Ukrainian case 
supports Karimov’s view that involvement of foreign countries in these revolutions 
was prompted by their geopolitical interests and facilitated by their assistance to 
democratization movements. 
4.2.3. The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan
In March 2005, regime change resulting from revolutionary protests in 
Kyrgyzstan increased the anxiety of Uzbek government. The proximity of the two 
countries led Karimov to believe that his regime was also at risk. The president of 
Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev (1991-2005) maintained a strict control over the media 
                                                                                                                                         
agency calls democracy projects.” See Joel Brinkley, “ Dollars for Democracy?: U.S. aid to Ukraine 
Challenged” The New York Times, 21 December 2004.
151 Matt Kelly, “U.S. Money Helped Opposition in Ukraine” The San Diego Union Tribune, 11 
December 2004, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041211/news_1n11usaid.html ( July 
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and could not achieve economic prosperity in his country.152 The political opposition 
to Akayev regime was relatively weak because of the extent of rivalry between the 
clans.153 The contrast between clans was also apparent in terms of their geographical 
concentration. While the south of the country was located by cleavages open to 
western influence and Uzbek presence, the north of the country was resided by 
groups favoring Russian policies. In this context Akayev was known as being closer 
to the northerners.154 The absence of a united political opposition in the country 
enabled Akayev to use his power without parliamentary restrictions. 
The event, which ignited the Tulip Revolution, was the deception in the 
parliamentary election of 27 February 2005. In the election, some of the candidates 
from the south were barred and after the results were revealed a small group from the 
south protested Akayev regime. However, the mobilization of a broader group of 
protesters occured when support came from some of the country’s powerful northern 
politicians and clans. In March 2005, opposition groups united under the name of 
People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan and insisted on the resignation of Akayev. This 
movement was not indicative of a new, united political party with a specific program 
or leadership. It rather symbolized the common grievances of different opposition 
groups. 
On 18 March, the governors’ offices in the southern cities of Osh and Jalabad 
were occupied by demonstrators. Later, airport police stations and TV studios were 
occupied by crowds. Before 24 March “The Peoples Movement of Kyrgyzstan 
merged with NGO activists, local businessmen, unaffiliated politicians, and 
                                                
152 Alisher Khamidov, Kyrgyzstan’s Revolutionary youth: Between State and Opposition “ SAIS 
Reviwe 26, no.2 ( 2006), p.87.
153 Every kind of tribal, regional and bureaucratic elite formations refers to the concept of ‘clan’.
154Scott Radnitz, “What Really happened in Kyrgyzstan?” Journal of Democracy 17,no.2 (2006), p. 
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mobilization leaders from others regions”155 From the media releases, it is clear that 
most of the protesters who were present in front of the government building in 
Bishkek, consisted of poor and unemployed men and women. Observers, who 
stressed poor economic profile of protesters, underestimated the role of civil society 
organizations in the protests. “NGOs equally played a minor role. Kyrgyzstan like 
other Central Asian republics has a small urban population and clearly lacks a strong 
civil society. That is why most of protesters in Bishkek came from the 
countryside.”156
Although the United States provided aid to Kyrgyz NGOs in the name of the 
promotion of democracy, its presence in Kyrgyzstan was much more related to its 
access to military bases and concerns about security. The US had no difficulty in 
receiving support from Akayev’s government but his alliances with Russia and China 
may have led US administration to worry about its relative gains in the region.
Kyrgyzstan’s external relations with the U.S., Russia and China also exhibited a kind 
of strategic competition.  The U.S. could get an air base at Manas outside the capital 
city Bishkek in 2001; next year Russia signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan and by 
this agreement guaranteed to operate in the Kant air base. In addition to these 
alliances, relations with China also intensified and Chinese soldiers were allowed to 
launch operations with Kyrgyz forces in the region157
Alternatively, the U.S. involvement in the formation of this revolution may 
be explained in terms of its long-term strategic plans. The U.S. may have wanted to 
remove the Akayev regime because of its undemocratic policies not simply because 
he did not show commitment to the U.S. interests. As mentioned previously, the 
protection and promotion of democracy became one of the U.S top priorities after the 
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2003 invasion of Iraq. U.S. claims could be convincing only if they followed a 
consistent global policy. In this view, it is not necessary to point out deterioration in 
relations between the two countries other than the authoritarian nature of Akayev’s 
regime in order to explain U.S. support for the opposition groups in Kyrgyzstan.
However, these assumptions cannot prove the view that the U.S. needed to 
change the Kyrgyz regime in order to counter Russian dominance and so 
intentionally supported the dissidents in Tulip Revolution. Even though U.S. aid to 
the formation of Kyrgyz civil society (mainly on the side of opposition) was a reality 
there was no other setback in US-Kyrgyz  relations, which would justify Karimov’s 
view that democratic revolutions in Central Asian countries were motivated by the 
U.S.. Stephen Young who was nominated as US ambassador to Kyrgyzstan had 
warned government not to open fire during the protests in Bishkek. The US 
ambassador’s attitude was also perceived by Karimov as direct U.S. support for 
opposition groups in Tulip Revolution.
Moreover, civil society groups were not active in the first protests in 
Kyrgyzstan. Participants in the Tulip Revolution were mainly unemployed people, 
friends, and relatives of the candidates barred from the election.158
To sum up, two prominent factors in the Tulip Revolution may justify 
Karimiov’s claims. First, the multiplicity of Kyrgyzstan’s international alliances may 
have urged the U.S. to increase its relative position and to foster a new, more loyal, 
government, which would decrease the extent of its cooperation with Russia and 
China. Second, democratization problems, which were similar in both Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, evidently resulted in problematic relations with the U.S. whose 
foreign policy was identified with the promotion of democracy after 2003 in a more 
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pronounced way. Therefore this factor also may have led the U.S. to strengthen the 
Kyrgyz civil society as a means of democratization.
Corruption and undemocratic practices were common in Georgia, Ukraine 
and Kyrgyzstan prior to the colored revolutions. It was also common that, although 
the extent of their capacities varied, civil society organizations funded by the U.S. 
had some role in the mobilization of protesters in these revolutions. Karimov’s 
claims concerning the role of civil society groups in the organization of the Andican 
Uprising are therefore worth exploring.
4.3. Civil Society in Uzbekistan 
Did civil society groups play a role in the organization of the Andican 
Uprising? Mainly funded by the U.S. and international donors, these organizations 
and human rights activists in Uzbekistan were accused by the government of creating 
social instability. Since independence, the establishment of a civil society in 
Uzbekistan was supported by western aid. “Democracy assistance programs, 
however, have not been as successful in effecting large-scale structural changes in 
the region or strengthening grassroots democracy beyond individual local 
successes.”159   
Exploitation of non-governmental organizations in the formation of civil 
society did not work in Uzbekistan. Due to fundamental inclinations among the 
                                                
159 Fiona Adamson,    “International democracy assistance in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: building 
civil society from the outside” in The Power and Limits of NGO: A Critical Look at  Building 
Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia ed. Sarah E. Mendelson and John K Glenn ( New York, 
Columbia University Press,2002), p. 178.
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society, The Uzbek government always viewed the activities of non-governmental 
organizations with suspicion. That is why foreign aid allocated to the support of 
NGOs was perceived as benefiting only the secular part of the population.160  All 
freedoms are supposed to have related with the progress of civil society and in this 
context freedom of speech and media are important factors to be utilized in the 
construction of it. However, in Uzbekistan strict control over media and human 
rights organizations have created a great difficulty over the formation of the genuine 
civil society.161
Daniel Stevens stated that during interviews he made with 200 NGO leaders 
in Uzbekistan, “only one used the term ‘human rights’, the NGO sector in 
Uzbekistan tended to pursue quiet cooperation with the government in service 
provision and polite technocratic advocacy.”162 Non-governmental organizations 
funded by foreign sources in Uzbekistan were inclined to restrict the problems on 
which they take on. In this process human rights activists and openly religious people 
were excluded from the NGOs’ activities in order to avoid from being banded and to 
continue to be only channel of foreign endowment.163 These organizations were 
called as GONGOs (Government Organized – Non Governmental Organizations.)164
“Women’s Committee, the Makhalla Foundation, ‘Soglom Avlod Uchan’ (a health 
                                                
160 David M. Abramson, “A Critical Look at NGOs and Civil Society as Means to an End in 
Uzbekistan” Human Organization Vol 8, no. 3 (1999), p 24.
161 “Journalists, human rights defenders and others jailed for exercising their freedom of expression 
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p.152
67
GONGO), Kamolot (a youth services GONGO)” were among the organizations in 
accordance with the government’s policies165
Apart from these GONGOs there were a few human rights organizations that 
had legal status in Uzbekistan before Andican uprising. The Legal Aid Society was 
the first organization registered in 1999. The Independent Human Rights 
Organization of Uzbekistan was accepted as legal by Ministry of Justice in 2002. The 
Human rights organization Ezgulik was the last one to be allowed operate within the 
country in 2003.166 According to Brian Grodsky, Karimov’s limited toleration of 
these three organizations was mainly facilitated by U.S. efforts in promoting 
democracy and its promise of financial aid to the government.167
In addition to these organizations’ scarcity in absolute terms their quality and 
efficacy profile was also limited. According to the NGO sustainability index, 
Uzbekistan’s score of NGO sustainability was third worst in over all ranking among 
the former Soviet republics. Uzbekistan’s 5.2 score indicates that the development of 
non-governmental organizations in the country was already being hindered before 
the Andican Uprising. 
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Table II. NGO sustainability index, selected countries and years168
Country/year                                                         NGO sustainability index
Estonia 2004                                                         2.1
Poland 2004                                                          2.3
Hungary 2004                                                       2.6
Latvia 2004                                                           2.6
Ukraine 2003                                                        3.9
Georgia 2002                                                        4.2
Kyrgyzstan 2004                                                   4.2
Uzbekistan 2004                                                   5.2
Belarus 2004                                                         5.6
Turkmenistan 2004                                               5.6
Source: USAID, 2005. The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia169
In the determination of NGO sustainability, different parameters were taken 
into consideration. Factors like legal environment, financial viability, infrastructure, 
public image, and organizational capacity were evaluated. The small number of 
registered NGOs indicates a low level of legal environment (5.5), and the low score 
(6) awarded to financial viability denotes the lack of access to foreign funding. Since 
the government issued a banking regulation that restricted the circulation of cash 
money in 2004 and cash payments became subject to the strict control of banks, all 
of the independent non-governmental organizations suffered from insufficient 
budgets.
                                                
168 In this index 1 represents the highest level of sustainability while 7 indicates to the lowest point.
169 USAID, “The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia,”  
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2005/index.htm  (July 27,2008)
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Table III: 2005 Scores for Uzbekistan
5.7
5.5
5.3
5.3
6
5.3
5.5
5.6
1 3 5 7
Public Image
Infrastructure
Service Provision
Advocacy
Financial Viability
Organizational Capacity
Legal Environment
NGO Sustainability 
Source: USAID, 2005. The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia170
Organizational capacity and infrastructure were also poor because of this financial 
problem. Government made payment to GONGOs only and ‘Law on non-State non-
Commercial organizations’ did not allow NGOs to make profit from any economic 
activity. 171
The Insufficient facilities available to non-governmental organizations 
combined with their low level capacity to participate into political life make it clear 
that “civil society” could not have played a vital role in the Andican Uprising. Even 
though it was obtained from foreign donors, delivery of this aid was subject to strict 
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governmental control and banking regulations blocked direct withdrawal of large 
sums. In this respect it looks like Karimov who learnt much from the colored 
revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, might have conducted a pre-emptive policy in 
order to avoid from being attacked.
4.4. Clan Politics
Clans in Uzbekistan still form an important part of the nation’s social 
structure and continue to be viewed in terms of regional solidarity. These solidarity 
groups provide advantageous positions to their members and relatives.172
Consequently membership in a particular clan is more significant than overall Uzbek 
identity. This clan-based division is common among officials who hold important 
positions in state posts. After the collapse of the Soviet Union “Karimov poised to 
consolidate a puppet legislature yet clan interests have prevented the creation of a 
strong executive party, parties or presidential bloc.”173
After the Andican  Uprising  an alternative explanation was presented to 
clarify the effect of clan politics on the conflict between high number of protesters 
and Karimov government on 13 May 2005.174 The protests began in response to the 
trial of 23 businessmen who were accused of belonging to the illegal Islamic group, 
                                                
172 Grzegorz Zasada, p. 74.
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World Politics 56 (2004), p. 251.
174 “Political explosion in the country might have been triggered by not only the Islamists but also by 
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Ekremiye. They also known to had close relationships with the impeached governor 
of Andican, Kobilijon Obdiov who was supported by the Ferghana clan.
Therefore the arrests of these businessmen created suspicion that Karimov 
had used his power to suppress the dissident members of the clan because of their 
failure to provide stability in Andican. Saydulla Begaliev, the new governor, began 
to suppress the supporters of Obdiov. The 23 businessmen who resisted Begaliev’s 
attacks were ultimately arrested. “The businessmen were allegedly advised to sell 
their enterprises to the allies of the new regional governor. When they refused, they 
were taken into custody.”175 The Andican Uprising appears to have been rooted in 
local politics dominated by clan rivalry.176
While Chris Seiple has claimed that “the political ascendancy of Karimov 
guarantees that the Samarkand clan is restored to power”177 Kathleen Collins argues 
that, Karimov himself is not totally committed to any of the clans.178 According to 
her, since 1996, Karimov who acted as mediator among influential clans was trying 
to eliminate the structural constraints of clan based Uzbek politics. State legitimacy 
of the state and nation building process was disrupted by private interests of clan 
networks.179 Karimov  explained this problematical characteristic of nation building 
process with the following sentences;
Striving for the elimination of such a corrupt legacy [clan politics] is one of 
the primary strategic tasks of our state …that is why it is a priority of the 
highest political importance to urge the need energetically to cut short 
regionalism and the formation of cliques, which are hampering our common 
cause. We must continue to emphasize that there is only one Uzbek nation in 
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the world, and there are no national differences between the descendents of 
Khorezm Ferghana or Surkhandarya: they are all Uzbeks.180
At the middle of his tenure of office, Karimov “gradually introduced 
provincial leaders especially from his Samarkand clan into the political inner circles 
by restocking the Cabinet of ministers and the presidential councils.”181 However 
since he was dependent on the support of clans and their relatively equal strength, 
Karimov was attempting to distribute power between influential clans rather than to 
eliminate them. In 1992 “The Tashkent clan held 60% of the key posts: Prime 
Minister, Minister of Foreign Foreign Affairs and First Deputy Prime Minister and 6 
of the 10 deputy prime ministers.”182  In the following years a number of ministers 
who had affiliation with Samarkand increased while the Tashkent clan lost standing.
       Table IV. Composition of Selected State Structures by Region 1992-2001183
Region          Cabinet of Minister                  State Committees   
1992 1996 2001 1992 1996 2001
Tashkent 18 15 5 7 3 1
Fergana 5 3 1 0 2 1
Samarkand 3 6 19 2 6 9
Bukhara 1 1 3 1 0 1
Khorezm 2 3 0 0 2 0
Surkan Darya 1 2 1 2 1 1
Kashka Darya 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 30 30 29 12 15 14
The statistics from 1996 also indicate that Karimov did not support the 
Samarkand clan to balance the power of Tashkent simply because he wanted to 
increase the power of his own clan. However, Samarkand’s obvious domination of 
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the cabinet and state comities in 2001 increased the doubts that Karimov might have 
intentionally favored it and the balance was actually not a matter of his politics. Two 
conclusions can be reached on the basis of this evidence. First, Karimov may have 
supported the Samarkand clan because of his own affiliation with it. Second, he may 
have wanted to decrease the role of the Tashkent clan because its foreign policy 
orientation was a potential handicap in view of the improving relations between the 
U.S. and Uzbekistan. Bailey has argued that Karimov expressed his concern by “a 
thinly veiled reference to Tashkent’s historical reliance on Moscow that some clan 
leaders might use external forces to promote their own interests.”184  
Although the above conclusions appear valid, some evidence exists that 
Uzbek politics necessitated Karimov’s neutral position of on clan matters. In addition 
to the administrative difficulties stem from the rivalry between clan members, 
economic reforms were suspended. The economic effects of the primacy of clans in 
Uzbek politics were an important drawback Karimov had to face. The three most 
influential clans,  Ferghana, Tashkent, and Samarkand competed to control the most 
important sectors of Uzbek economy. The Insistence of these clans’ leaders on 
maintaining and even increasing their share in the Uzbek economy explains the 
monopoly over the cotton, gold, and gas sectors. For instance, in 2003 state adviser 
Ismail Jurabekov, a former prime minister and the leader of the Samarkand clan 
controlled, with his supporters in the cabinet, almost all of the cotton industry in 
Uzbekistan.185
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Jurabekov had been accused of colluding with regional bosses and fired by 
Karimov from the prime ministry in 1998.186 This was also a clear indication of that 
Karimov was not openly in favor of Samarkand clan. Rather, he was inclined to act 
against the improper personal benefit of affiliates no matter upon which clan they 
work. It was also a system in which nobody was allowed to become too powerful. 
While he played a neutral broker role between clan interests, Karimov himself also 
made use of this problematical system in order to maintain his leadership. 
The financial resources available to clans also affected their capacity to 
compete with each other in politics. This involved a complex structure wherein clan 
members who held crucial positions in decision-making used their political power to 
increase their financial assets while these sources strengthened their political 
influence. 187 In order to decrease the influence of clans and thus the influence of 
informal politics, electoral regulations created five different pro-regime parties, 
which were to represent five distinct social sectors. By this method Karimov’s parties 
could gain 49% of the seats in the 1999 parliamentary elections.188  The remainder of 
the seats, however, were dominated by individual politicians who were bound to 
clans with strong kinship or regional affiliation. 
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Table V: Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Uzbekistan in 2000189
President                                                                 Islam Karimov*
Prime Minister                                                        Shavkat Mirziyyayev*
Deputy Prime Minister                                           Abdullah Aripov
Deputy Prime Minister                                           Rustam Azimov**
Minister of Culture and Sports                               Alisher Azizkhojayev*
Minister of Defense                                                Ruslan Mirzayev**
Minister of Finance                                                 Rustam Azimov**
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations,
Investments, and Trade                                           Elyor Ganiev**
Minister of Justice                                                   Buritosh Mustafaev*
Chief of Staff, Presidential Administration             Zilemkhon Haidarov* 
Chairman of National Security Service (NSS)        Rustam Inoyatov** 
*   Important Player from the Samarkand Clan
** Important Player from the Tashkent Clan
The allocation of ministries to affiliates of the Tashkent and Samarkand clans 
proves that the infiltration of informal clan politics into formal parliamentary politics 
was one of the prominent features of Karimov’s regime. Karimov’s attempts to 
balance the power of different clans resulted in a reshuffling of the cabinet.190 In 
2004, before the Andijan Uprising, Juarabekov, the most powerful leader of 
Samarkand clan was dismissed from his advisory position. Criminal allegations were 
given as the reason for his dismissal but the general view was that Karimov was 
trying to control the increasing power of Samarkand clan and channel its economic 
assets and privileged status to his own family. Former U.K. ambassador Murray 
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stated that “if you look at the people who were very close to Karimov a few years 
ago, many of them have now been thrown out; and, in particular, their economic 
interests and assets have often been diverted to Gulnara [Karimov’s eldest daughter, 
who controlled the oil, gas, and telecommunication sectors in Uzbekistan.] And there 
now are a lot of people who used to be very important who now have an interest in 
seeing Karimov go.”191  Karimov may have also wanted to strengthen Gulnara as a 
candidate for the next presidential election.192 This supports the notion that the 
Andican Uprising could have been organized by Karimov’s outgoing partners and 
their supporters.
The change of local governor in Andican weakened supporters of former 
governor Obdiov. Even though it cannot be assumed that the Andican Uprising was a 
primarily resulted from clan rivalry, it followed the arrest of 23 businessmen. 
Combined with poor economic conditions these arrests inspired greater public 
protests in Andican on 13 May 2005. Clan politics appear to have contributed to the 
rise of the Andican Uprising in two ways. First, clan economic interests made it 
difficult to liberalize the Uzbek economy, and clan monopoly over crucial 
commodities damaged the agricultural and business sectors. Thus economic 
dissatisfaction prompted protests in Andican. Second, the political repression which 
clans applied to each other when they find the opportunity to do so had social 
consequences for the supporters of defeated factions. The best example of this 
practice was when almost one thousand people lost their jobs after their employers 
(the 23 businessmen) were arrested as a consequence of this political repression.
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  After the Andican Uprising, appointments to the crucial offices changed the 
balance, and most of these offices were awarded to people who had a SNB 
background. Rustam Inoyatov led the National Security Service since 1995 and was 
supported by the Tashkent faction. In October 2006 Begaliev, Andijan governor 
since 2004, was likewise replaced with the former chief of police in Namangan, 
Major-General Ahmajan Usmanov, who served in the combating of extremism and 
terrorism.193                                                            
Figure II. Rivalry within Ministries 194
The concentration of two factions in the two most important governmental 
institutions, the Interior Ministry and National Security Council, demonstrates the 
profound rivalry between them. Almatov could gain more support from police forces 
and his affiliates could dominate the cabinet in 2000. Thus, for Karimov, increasing 
the power of this clan had to be curtailed to balance power. After the Andican 
Uprising “The Samarkand clan suffered another political blow when Interior 
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Minister Zokir Almatov resigned in late 2005, citing poor health. Karimov 
appointed a deputy director of the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) to replace 
Almatov.” 195 This was important because the SNB was under the influence of the 
Tashkent clan and now used by Karimov to replace the powerful figures within the 
Samarkand clan.
All this data demonstrates that Karimov played his cards expeditiously in 
order to balance the power of clans. He did not always favor the Samarkand faction. 
Karimov appointed his supporters to important positions but limited their power 
when they became too powerful. Karimov’s leadership strategy is thus significant for 
understanding the complex and irregular character of clan politics in Uzbekistan. 
                                                
195 Radio Fee Europe- Radio Free Liberty, “Uzbekistan: Karimov Appears to Have Political Clans 
Firmly  in Hand” http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070977.html (August 5,2008)
79
CHAPTER V
ANDICAN UPRISING
The events of 12-14 May in Andijan have been subject to different 
interpretations. The governmental investigation committee formed to monitor and 
analyze the uprising reached the conclusion that it was a revolutionary attempt 
organized by members of the Ekremiye Movement and their supporters. 
However many human rights activists and western scholars argued that the 
uprising was primarily the result of economic discontent in Uzbek society. 
Evaluations of the nature of the uprising, estimates of the death toll, and the authors’ 
identifications of these casualties varied according to the different accounts of 
witnesses and the analyses of various scholars. That is why it is not possible to make 
a certain assessment about the events occurred that day. Nevertheless journalists who 
were already there could clarify the incident to some extent. 196
                                                
196“An information blackout has been clamped by Uzbek authorities with interruption of foreign TV 
channels including Russian networks and CNN.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia, “Tashkent clamps 
information blackout ahead of imminent attack”, 13 May 2005.
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In this part of the study, an accurate version of the scenario will be given 
through considering different assessments made by refugees, human rights 
organizations, scholars and the Uzbek government.
5.1. The Background of the Uprising
In August 2004, 23 businessmen were arrested on charge of being members 
of the illegal Ekremiye movement. All of the businessmen were most successful 
entrepreneurs and managers from Andican. Consequently their supporters perceived 
their arrest as a government attack on the economic activities of a conservative 
religious community. This view is supported by human rights activists who claim 
that the government abused its power in order to restrict other elements by accusing 
them of religious fundamentalism. 
     While the interrogation of 23 businessmen continued. Uzbek authorities 
searched for other suspects from the Ekremiye group and began to arrest them. On 4 
September 2004, armed National Security Service units entered into the homes of 
twenty employees of Turon Productions Furniture Company and searched for 
suspects.  During their detention all admitted that they were the members of the 
Ekremiye Movement, however later the same detainees claimed that they were 
harassed and forced to sign a confession.197  The International Crisis Group revealed 
                                                
197 Gulnoza Saidazimova, “Uzbekistan: Protesters Charge Officials With Using Extremism Charges to 
Target Entrepreneurs”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 May 2005, 
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some of the interrogations conducted with these people after they were released, and 
one of them said that:
They brought us pre-prepared schemes of the organization. They said it 
showed the organizational structure, with all our titles and positions and they 
told us to sign it, and we’d go home in few days—otherwise they’d lock us 
up for ten years.198
On 10 February 2005, nine detainees were prosecuted for crimes including 
association with a radical group and illegal movement.199 Six of them were held 
incommunicado. Trials of 23 businessmen began on 10 May of the same year. 
Parallel to the trials, the families of detainees to support these businessmen initiated 
peaceful protests. These demonstrations consisted of people’s gathering around the 
courthouse and from 10 February until 13 May no other vocal or written protests 
occurred.200
5.2. The Prison Attack
Prior events showed that tension was increasing among the crowd protesting 
the trial of 23 businessmen. On May 13, this tension erupted in violent and bloody 
events. According to reports on the night of 12 May the businessmen’s friends, 
relatives and supporters,201 whose numbers were between fifty and one hundred, 
                                                
198 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, p. 4. 
199 BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, “Twenty-three Uzbeks stand trial on anti-state charges”, 12 
February 2005 
200 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising p.4. 
201 Sharifjon Shokirov who is the bother of Shokurjon Shokirov, and Abduljon Parpiev  who was 
arrested after Taskent bombings in 1999 were known as the leaders of the prison  attack. 
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decided to attack the prison and free them202 The action occurred mostly between 
Babur Square and the Andican prison through Navoi Prospect, where administrative 
buildings are located.
Figure 1.Andican Center
Source: Human Rights Watch, “The Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- Andijan 
Massacre May 13 2005203
According to the eyewitness the event began around 12.30 a.m. The residents 
of Gumbaz Makhalla reported that insurgents tried to take over the army post 
                                                
202 Vasiliy Kashin, Aleksey Nikolskiy, “Uzbekistan is on fire”,  Russica Izvestia 14 May 2005, p.A2
203 Human Rights Watch, The Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- Andijan Massacre May 13 2005,  p.1
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stationed in the very center of their district;204 this attempt was stopped by troops, 
however nearly at the same time or after this event insurgents attacked to the police 
station located 6-7 km away from there. It is known from the official statement that 
insurgents killed four policemen on duty and obtained various weapons including 
assault rifles, pistols and hand grenades.205 Uzbek Prosecutor General Rashid 
Kadirov reported that
During the attack [on the police station], the criminals murdered four 
personnel of the patrol post, [and] four more were seriously wounded. 
They took 264 firearms, 40 grenades, and more than 8,000 bullets.206
The same armed group attacked the near by military station and obtained a 
number of arms, “including 53 machine guns, four rifles, and more than 2,000 
bullets, as well as a ZIL-130 truck.”207 Afterward, they left for Andican prison where 
the 23 businessmen were jailed.  Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan reported that five 
guards were killed, 34 officials were wounded208 and 527 of 734 prisoners were 
freed. However, the number of prisoners freed was estimated in the thousands by 
eyewitnesses and some foreign observers.209 There are contradictory statements 
about the dialog between prisoners and insurgents that night. The interviews made by 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) with freed prisoners showed that, people who were 
released were asked  to go home or to join the protest and there was no quarrel 
between insurgents and prisoners. However, according to another eyewitness 
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interviewed by Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “the 
insurgents urged detainees to join them.”210 From the observations of Akiner is 
seems that there were prisoners who did not want to leave but were forced by the 
insurgents to do so.
…A prisoner (Pr2) whom the insurgents had thought to be dead regained 
consciousness. He recounted his story to me himself. He told me that he 
called out to the crowd to save him, telling them that it was the insurgents, 
not the guards, who had tried to kill him.211
Akiner’s account was identical with those of the official figures. Abdukarim
Shodiyev, deputy head of the Interior Ministry's directorate penal of institutions 
stated “Over 500 prisoners were released from the Andijon prison by extremists on 
the night of 12-13 May. Of them, over 400 have returned voluntarily. Many of them 
are coming with weapons given by extremists”212
5.3. The Take-Over of the Hokimat Building213
Afterwards, some of the freed prisoners and insurgents arrived at the Hokimat
building, six kilometers north of the Andican prison. 
Uzbek security services tried to stop the convoy on its way to the Hokimat
building and killed three insurgents on Oshskaia Street. Nevertheless, the efforts of 
security services to stop them did not succeed and almost all the group arrived intact 
at the Hokimat building and occupied it. It is interesting that only one guard was 
                                                
210OSCE - ODIHR, Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005
(Warsaw, 2005)
211 Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijan; an Independent Assessment,(Washington: Silk Road Studies 
Papers 2005),  p.16.
212 BBC monitoring Newsfile, “Over 400 freed convicts return voluntarily - Uzbek official” ITAR-
TASS News Agency 18 May 2005 
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protecting the building during the night, so insurgents did not have difficulty 
entering. This shows that government might not have had any intention of using 
force before the protests turned into a violent uprising and the security services might 
not have felt it necessary to protect official buildings with a greater number of 
guards.
Another group of attackers encountered more intense resistance on the way to 
the Hokimat building. It happened while this group was passing the headquarters of 
the National Security Service (SNB- Sluzhba Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti) and 
naturally there were a large number of policemen and armed officials around the 
building. A gun battle resulted in the death of 15-30 insurgents.214 However even the 
most critical human rights institutions reported that “A heavy gun battle broke out 
around the SNB building, although it is unclear whether the fighting was initiated by 
the attackers aiming to overrun the SNB building, or by SNB officers tying to stop 
the attackers’ progress.”215
The attackers continued and turned this individual event into a mass 
movement. Some of the interviewers stated that attackers and freed prisoners called 
their friends and relatives and asked them to come through Babur Square so as to 
gain public support.216
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5.4. Protests at Babur Square
As the number of protesters increased over time, the nature of the movement 
changed as well, and the violent actions of armed insurgents were transformed into 
massive civilian protest  in the early morning of 13 May. By that time, around 100 
protesters had arrived in the square and security forces were waiting to control and 
suppress the protests. According to eyewitnesses: 
Military trucks, ZIL-131 and URALs were standing like a column and a 
column of ten jeeps followed them. Roads to the square were blocked at 
Chorquzar Street by two busses; the junction of Kamil Yashin Street and 
Babur Shah Street was also blocked with vehicles217
No cars or other vehicles were allowed to enter to the square, however people 
could do so by walking. In the meantime people around the city were informed about 
the protest and their number slowly grew to the thousands. At Approximately 8.00 
a.m. tracks came from the direction of Navoi Prospect and shoot at people without 
warnings
 According to the report of OSCE by 11.00 a.m, instances of shooting at 
people repeated continuously. Around midday the angry crowd began to take 
hostages from the security services. 
At some point between 13.00 and 14.00 hrs police fired from vehicle coming 
down Kamil Yashin Street. When it reached the roundabout, the crowd 
stopped it. A group of 5-6 men from the crowd pulled one policeman out of 
the vehicle and took him to the Hokimat building. The three other police 
officers escaped, although their weapons were seized by the crowd218
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The hostage men were taken to the Hokimat building and handed over to the 
insurgents with the help of armed civilians. After the seizure of Hokimat building, 
government officials reported that 50 people were taken hostage and used as human 
shields by the insurgents. The hostages consisted of various officials including police 
officers, soldiers, firefighters, and civil servants, the chief of the tax inspection 
authority, and the head of the prosecutors’ office. 219 The number of protesters after 
friday prayer increased to approximately 10,000.220
According to Akiner, it was not a coincidence that the protest of 13 May took 
place on a friday when Muslims gather in mosques for congregational prayer. This 
also indicates that people‘s commitment to religion played an important role in 
mobilization. In this sense, religious sentiments were not necessarily the origin of 
their protest but a means bringing the protesters together.
During the protest, citizens expressed discontent with unemployment and the 
corrupt policies of the local government. There was nothing related to religion in the 
protesters’ speeches at Babur Square. An eyewitness described the initial phase of 
the as follows,
They are shouting social slogans, I would like to stress, not Islamic ones. 
They say that things are bad, ask why the authorities have brought the people 
to live in such misery. They explain their actions by this. They say they are 
for freedom and so forth.221
 Consequently most of the media and human rights advocates interpreted the 
absence of religious claims as if all these events occurred independent of religious 
motives and resulted from poor economic conditions in Uzbekistan and crooked the 
government’s policies.
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 It is apparent from later interviews with refuges in Kyrgyzstan that “people 
were informed by organizers that the purpose of the meeting was to protest against 
the government, the unfair trial process, and in particular about the fact that there had 
not yet been a verdict in the trial against the 23 businessmen.”222 According to 
refugees’ statements it seems the protest initially started to criticize the unjust 
imprisonment of 23 businessmen and later was accompanied by social and 
economical complaints of the growing crowd. “The prosecution of the businessmen, 
and the closure of their enterprises, has resulted in the loss of as many as 1,000 
jobs.”223 Since there were many people who had been employed in the companies of 
those 23 arrested businessmen, they had lost their jobs and so economic conditions 
were naturally at the center of their complaints.224 However all these facts do not 
necessarily mean that religious issues were irrelevant to the events in Andican on 13 
May. Islam underlies the ideological background of 23 accused businessmen and 
their supporters. Even if the detainees’ commitment to the Ekrem Yuldashev’s ideas 
does not show any trace of extremism, religion became more important for their 
supporters in response to harsh measures of the government.
During the day, the protest continued in spite of the violent response of armed 
officials. “In the afternoon the Ahunbabaev Theatre and the Bakirov Cinema, both in 
the immediate vicinity of the square were set on fire by unidentified persons”225
People whom human rights advocates interviewed said that they stayed in the square 
because they were told that Karimov was coming to listen to their problems. After 
their expectations appeared futile, armed insurgents brought the chief of the tax 
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inspection authorities and head of the prosecutors’ office to the podium in the square. 
They were obliged to tell the crowd that the trials of the 23 businessmen were not 
fair and the taxes were too high for traders in the bazaar to survive.  After the 
speeches of these two officials, the angry crowd started to shout slogans and tension 
increased. At around 14.00-15.00 hours observers reported that policemen began to 
shoot at crowd from the roof of nearby buildings.
We know from Karimov’s speech of on National TV First Channel,226 that 
Interior Minister Zakir Almatov negotiated on the phone with insurgents who seized 
the Hokimat Building. The Insurgents said that they had wanted the official release 
of 23 businessmen. Almatov rejected their demands and offered insurgents a safe 
corridor to leave the country. He told them
What is done that is done. You have done what you have done. You have 
reached your goal. But we have a strict word, a condition; let it even be 
suggestion for you. You will not lose a hair from your heads. Nobody will 
touch you. If you want you can hand in your weapons or if you do not want to 
you may not return your weapons, here are three or four buses for you; you 
can go anywhere you want to in these buses. I repeat again nobody will touch 
you. Just say: this is the president's promise.227
“The negotiations continued for the whole day until 5:00 p.m. when the 
gunmen rejected the last government proposal that would allow them to leave the 
city.”228 From official reports it appears that those targeted by security services in the 
conflict were the group of armed men who used the crowd as a “live shield made up 
of women and children.”229 According OSCE’s findings “there were appeals from 
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the organizers not to leave the square.” 230 These appeals are a remarkable indication 
that the insurgents actually used unarmed civilians as shields  without any concern 
about their safety. This was also not among the concerns of government troops. “At 
about 18.00, government troops opened fire and began storming the Hokimat 
building. The crowd, numbering between 5,000 and 15,000 dispersed in all 
directions.”231
5.5. Government Shootings and Departure from the Square
After the government troops opened fire, additional policemen and the 
military forces were sent to end the protest. These security forces came from the 
south via Navoi Prospect and from the west by way of Kamil Yashin Street.  At the 
same time Cholpon Street was blocked to the north by a barricade of buses on the 
corner of Unitel Telecom and there was an ambush on the Colhguzar Street behind 
the Hokimat building. According to the eyewitnesses, all exits from the square had 
been blocked and armed forces were shooting at people indiscriminatingly.232
Trucks, which are full of security forces with arms, were shooting from the direction 
of Navoi Park and TSUM shopping center. Soldiers in the truck that was coming 
down from the Navoi Prospect shot people who tried to defend themselves by using 
an UAZ vehicle as a shield.
After continuous shootings, people started to run through northeast Cholpon 
Street in order to leave the square. While leaving, they took approximately 15 
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hostages and put them front of the crowd because they thought that security forces 
would not shoot at hostages.233  When this group reach to the corner of Telecom 
building armed forces in trucks were waiting behind the barricade of busses located 
at the corner of east Parkovaya Street.234  After a while soldiers stopped shooting and 
rest of the people could pass near the buses and continued escaping through the 
street. It is known from the observers that shootings repeated with 15 minutes 
intervals. 
Troops opened fire again from the behind the escaping crowd after they 
passed the busses and, they reached the Cholpon Cinema. Meanwhile the residents of 
apartments located on the Cholpon Street did not open their doors to the protesters. 
Some civilians were seriously injured and most of them were shot near School 15. 
Realizing that they could not pass the blockade of armed trucks, the group decided to 
approach Bainalminal Street. During this time gunfire did not stop. As is cleat from 
interviews made by Human Rights Watch, most of the people Cholpon Street were 
killed.
Estimates on the number of casualties differ. While the Uzbek Government 
gives the total number of dead as 173, media, opposition parties and international 
organizations claim that the more accurate figure is between 800 and 1500.235
Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan, Rashidjon Kadyrov, stated that “32 of the dead 
people were police officers and servicemen for the government troops; he added that 
50 of the killed terrorists were foreigner and two of them were citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan.”236 Foreign involvement in the  protest increased the government’s 
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suspicion on that the uprising was sponsored by foreign countries or organized by 
international terror networks.
According to Akiner’s impressions of after visiting the region in the 
aftermath, the government’s estimations of the death toll are compatible with the 
official count of the dead in the Andican’s morgues. This figure is also supported by 
the statements of imams who told Akiner that they led 300 funeral prayers during the 
whole of May.237  Some claims that many of the corpses were buried in secret graves 
but there is no evidence to determine the accuracy of these rumors. Yet there were 
families who could not find their relatives after the events either in the morgues or in 
the refugee camps.238 Thus the possibility of that government buried the dead in mass 
graves cannot be ruled out.
5.6. Escape to the Kyrgyz Border  
According to the report by Human Rights Watch based mainly on the 
accounts of refugees, more than 600 people moved north to reach the Kyrgyz border.
After walking all night the group arrived at the border town of Teshik -Tosh at 6.00 
a.m on 14 May. One of the surviving refugees told Human Rights Watch that:
When we reached Teshik-Tosh a villager said there was another way to 
Kyrgyzstan through the hills. We had to reach Kyrgyzstan by any means. He 
showed the road and we followed him…. I was in the area, in the front were 
mostly women. Troops were waiting for us up ahead, they were expecting us. 
We got ambushed, they opened fire on us. I myself saw three dead women, 
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three dead men and a dead child. A lot of people were wounded in the back; 
they were shot as they were running away.239
Since borders were closed due to the strict control over shuttle trade between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the refuges could not easily cross the border, but after 
negotiating with authorities the border was opened to the people who wanted 
protection from Kyrgyzstan.240 After determining whether they were armed, Kyrgyz 
officials let them enter Kyrgyzstan across the Karadarya River. According to 
information provided by United Nations officials “490 Uzbek refugees had registered 
for asylum in Kyrgyzstan.”241  Bakiyev, the president, also stated “Kyrgyzstan has 
provided all necessary assistance to 539 citizens of Uzbekistan, who appeared on the 
territory of our country.”242
5.7. The Aftermath 
5.7.1. Restriction on the Flow of Information 
During and after the uprising Uzbek authorities prohibited the broadcasting of 
what happened in Andican on 13 May 2005. Latterly A Russian journalist released 
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after the seal of Andican described the government approach towards the media as 
follows,
The authorities of a district in Andijon Region decided we violated the law, 
filming things without any special permission, and took us to the local police 
station. The local policemen were polite but firm. They gave our papers back 
and sent us to Andijon. We are now on the town outskirts. We have managed 
to enter the city, but TV is banned from working here.243
Most of the media interpreted this restriction as an indication of Karimov’s 
effort to obscure the government’s violent interposition towards the protesters. When 
Karimov was asked why journalists were prohibited from covering the events, he 
said, “In which country have you seen foreign journalists being allowed into areas of 
military action?”244
Karimov also believed that the uprising was supported by foreign states, 
which wanted to promote regime change in the region. According to him, the 
Andican Uprising was organized by these powers and all information they would 
broadcast to the world about the events would be biased, distorted, exaggerated and 
used to accuse the government. On 17 May 2005 Karimov stated that; 
 I respect their (international media mostly western) views. I may not like 
their reports, but I am obliged to perceive their reports in which they present 
their views. I am obliged to respect every point of view. But it is very 
important that they should be based on specific facts and serious evidence. 245
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5.7.2. Intimidation and arrests 
Interior Minister Zohirjon Almatov said on 15 May 2005 that the Uzbek 
police have seized at least 70 organizers of the insurgence in Andican.246 However 
arrests were not confined to the proven organizers. After the government’s 
suppression of the Andican Uprising, control over the activities of human rights 
organizations was intensified. Karimov charged members of human rights 
organization with damaging the country‘s social stability. Representatives of Human 
Rights Watch reported that Saidjahon Zaynabitdinov, who did not hesitate to criticize 
violent response of government to Andican protests, was arrested by Uzbek officials 
on 21 May 2005.247
The chairman of the local branch of a human rights society, Yodgor 
Turlibekov, and his deputy, Nodir Ahadov, were detained by the police in 
Qarshi (the centre of [southern] Qashqadaryo Region) on 28 May, when they 
were about to leave for [central] Samarqand to attend a Freedom House 
seminar. The chairman of the Qashqadaryo branch of the Ezgulik human 
rights organization, Zulfiqor Mirzoqulov, was also arrested in the house at 
that moment. 248
The government oppression was not limited to the apprehension of human 
rights activists. The leaders and members of opposition parties were also detained. 
Two policemen entered the residence of, Daynov Tashanov, the chief of the Birlik 
opposition party's local branch, in Qarshi on 29 May 2005. Suspects from the
business sector were also kept in custody. Sanjar Umarov, a millionaire businessman 
                                                
246 BBC Monitoring Central Asia, “Some 70 rioters detained in troubled Uzbek town”15 May 2005
247 BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union “Key rights activist arrested in Uzbekistan “ Ferghana.ru 
news agency 24 May 2005
248 BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union “Pressure on Uzbek rights activists said intensified” 
Ferghana.ru news agency, 30 May 2005.
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and  leader of Sunshine Coalition249 was arrested in October 2005 on the grounds 
that he committed economic crimes.250 Director of the Sunshine Coalition, Nodira 
Khidoyatova, said that throughout the investigation all documents and computer 
disks were confiscated from the Sunshine Coalition bureau. 251 Hill and Jones also 
argued “Karimov moved against independent businessmen in Uzbekistan to prevent 
them from becoming alternative sources of funding and influence.”252
5.7.3. The Andican Trials and Asylum Seeking Uzbeks
Uzbek protesters who fled to Kyrgyzstan caused tension between Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz authorities. Karimov insistently asked the Kyrgyz government not to 
recognize terrorists as refugees and to send them back to Uzbekistan. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) requested that 
Kyrgyzstan not to repatriate Uzbek refugees and to act in accordance with the 1951
Convention related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.253 On 17 July 
2005 the United Nations and other governments called for the recognition of Uzbek 
                                                
249  Sunshine coalition was established in 2005 and its main priorities was pronounced as follows;  
“• Respect and observe the constitutional structure of the Republic of Uzbekistan • Confirming the 
willingness of the Sunshine Coalition to dialogue with the President  • Appeal to dissolution of 
ineffective government • Appeal to consolidation of the constructive powers of society, patriots of 
Uzbekistan, followers of the country's prosperity • Elaborating of the progressive reform program of 
the Uzbekistan 's economy as the strategy of surpassing development of the society.” See. Sunshine 
Uzbekistan, “ The Second Congress of Coalition for National Unity Sunshine Uzbekistan.” 
See.http://www.sunshineuzbekistan.org/congress.htm (July 29,2008)
250 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan Europe’s Sanction Asia Briefing No54 (Bishkek/Brussel, 
2006), p.6.
251 The Journal Of Turkish Weekly “ Leader of Sunshine Ssnjar Umarov arrestedin Tashkent.” 24 
October 2005. http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=21071 (July 29, 2008)
252 Fionna Hill, Kevin Jones, p.118
253 The Times of Central Asia “OSCE Asks Kyrgyzstan To Not Repatriate Uzbek Refugees”31 May 
2005 
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refugees in Kyrgyzstan.254  After Kyrgyz government hosted the refugees for a week, 
the interior ministry of Romania declared that they would accept the refugees.255  
“The 439 refugees boarded plane chartered by the IOM (International Organization 
for Migration) in Bishkek in the early hours of 29 July for a seven-hour flight to of 
Romania. ”256 The refugees in Romania continually expressed their fear of the 
possibility of deportation to Uzbekistan and said that they would be tortured and 
killed.257 According to the observations from the refugee camp in Uzbekistan people 
gave no indication of espousing signs of Islamic extremism.258 This observation also 
weakened the Uzbek government’s claim that the Ekremiye group and their 
supporters were fundamentalists and that the Andican uprising was organized with 
the help of radical groups.  However,
Defendant Lochin Imonqulov, captioned as a Kyrgyz citizen, spoke about 
how they came from Kyrgyzstan. "We came to Uzbekistan from behind the 
concrete slabs. There were about 70 of us. We were led by a man called 
Akrom. Half of us had weapons," he said. Defendant Ilhom Hojiyev, shown 
in video still carrying an assault rifle and posing to camera during the unrest, 
spoke about how they delivered weapons to Andijon. He said the Islamic 
group Hezb-e Tahrir and Wahhabis supported the militants. He also spoke 
about training of militants in Kyrgyzstan. "We learnt to fire pistols and 
assault rifles in the Kyrgyz hills," he said.259
The speeches of these defendants supported the Uzbek government’s official 
account of the events on 13 May. Most of the western media found the video record 
                                                
254 Farah Stockman, “Resettelement Plan Could Test U.S.-Uzbek Relations interviews Process Begins 
for 400 Who May Seek” Boston Globe 17 July 2005, p.A-5.
255 C.J. Chivers, “UN moves Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan Up to 455 to be resettled in 3rd 
country” The New York Times, 28 July 2005, p. A-3.
256 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Romania: IOM airlifts Uzbek refugees.” 29 July 
2005. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EVOD-6ERCVB?OpenDocument   ( July 
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257 Nicholas Wood, “Uzbek refugees in Romania fear their homeland's reach” International Herald 
Tribune , 19 September 2005, p. 4.
258 Nicholas Wood, “Uzbek refugees in Romania fear their homeland's reach” International Herald 
Tribune , 19 September 2005, p. 4.
259 Uzbek Television first channel, “Militants involved in Andijon events give evidence in Uzbek 
documentary “ 29 Jul,2005.
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used by government in the persecution of defendants to be, biased and driven by 
offensive motives of the Uzbek government. But this evidence and the defendants’
confessions made it clear that some of the armed protesters were not so innocent as 
international organizations assumed. In September 2005, fifteen men accused of 
involvement in the Andican Uprising were sent to trial. At the end of the first trial all 
defendants were sentenced to long prison terms. Due to the lack of transparency the 
rest of the Andican trials were not observed and that is why the exact number of 
people sentenced to prison is unknown.260
5.7.4. International Reaction
The International reaction to Andican uprising was shaped by broader 
geopolitical interests. Thus, different approaches of the east and the west to this 
specific event can be explained by their effort to balance each other in the region. 
What happened in Andican was subject to the polemical explanations of the 
government and protesters. The absence of any consensus about the facts left 
international actors ambiguous and their differing interpretations of the uprising were 
produced by their incompatible political motives. 
The United States did not know how to respond to this issue. State 
Department Spokesman Richard Boutcher said that the armed attack by civilians on 
government facilities and violence of terrorism would not be tolerated.261 Secretary 
of State Condolezza Rice emphasized the possibility that uprising may have stemmed 
                                                
260 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan : In For Long Haul Asia Briefing No.45 ( Bishkeek/Brussel 
2006 ), p. 6.
261 Voice of America Press, “ US Appeals for Restraint in Uzbekistan Amid Civil Unrest” 16 May 
2005
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from government authoritarianism and indicated on the necessity of reform in 
Uzbekistan.262  However, in later days the, attitude of the U.S. became more 
pronounced. John G.  Fox, chief of the State Department’s Office of Caucasus and 
Central Asian Affairs stated that “So far as we can tell, the Akramia group is neither 
extremist nor terrorist”263 The U.S. also warned Uzbekistan that it would cut 
financial aid if it was not allowed to conduct an international survey in Andican and 
subsequently “on 14 July 2005 The Bank of New York blocked the credit line to 
Uzbekistan.”264 The United States also assisted the transfer of refugees from 
Kyrgyzstan to Romania despite the Uzbek government’s objections. Thus the U.S 
reaction to the Andican Uprising targeted harsh response of government to public 
interests. Concerned with democratization of U.S. increased the volume of its 
criticism on human rights after the Andican Uprising.
The EU’s reaction to Andican was not different from that of the U.S. On 23 
May 2005 the EU’s External Relations Council Commissioner Benita Ferro Waldner 
condemned the Uzbek government’s arbitrary use of force on public protests in 
Andican and asked Uzbekistan to act in accordance with international agreements on 
human rights. Like the U.S., the European Union also called for an independent 
investigation of the events in Andican. After the trials of the detainees ended, 
European Union imposed economic and political sanctions on Uzbekistan. Arms 
sales to Uzbekistan were prohibited and later twelve Uzbek officials265 who had been 
                                                
262 International Crisis Group Andijon Uprising, p. 7.
263 Farah Stockman, “Resettelement Plan Could Test U.S.-Uzbek Relations interviews Process Begins 
for 400 Who May Seek” Boston Globe 17 July 2005, p. A-5.
264 BBC Monitoring Central Asia, “ Bank of New York Shuts credit lines to Uzbekistan,” Karavan-
Almaty  15 July 2005.
265 Interior Minister Zokirjon Almatov, Defense Minister Qodir Ghulomov, NSS head Rustam 
Inoyatov, Presidential adviser Ruslan Mirzoyev, Andijon governor Saydullo Begaliyev and General 
Vladimir Mamo were among these officials.
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deemed responsible for the death of 200 civilians in Andican on 13 May were 
banned from obtaining visas to EU countries for one year.266
Russia and China, on the other hand, gave full support to Karimov after his 
suppression of insurgents in Andican while the U.S and other western governments 
criticized him. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan stated   “this is 
fundamentally an Uzbek domestic matter.”267 The Chinese Foreign Ministry clarified 
that their intolerance for separatism, terrorism, and extremism was the primary 
motive in backing Uzbek president.268 By declaring that this was a domestic problem 
of Uzbekistan, China and Russia supported Karimov’s objection to an international 
investigation. Russia had always seen Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries 
as a source of instability and religious fundamentalism. As a result Russian support 
of the Karimov regime, which strictly controlled this threat for long years, was not 
surprising. Russia may also have wanted to increase its credibility in opposition to 
the U.S. presence in the region. 
5.7.5. Foreign Policy Implications of Andican Uprising
Quickly developing relations with Russia exhibited the reversal of Uzbek 
foreign policy. The Andican uprising, no doubt, accelerated the increasing 
cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan. The change in Uzbekistan’s foreign
relations was produced by its concerns over the survival of its ruling establishment. 
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Karimov saw the Andican uprising as a revolt against his regime sought international 
assistance for his survival. Closer relations with Russia were also hastened by 
Uzbekistan’s worsening relations of with the U.S and E.U. Severe criticism from 
these countries regarding the Uzbek regime’s indiscriminate use of force during 
Andican uprising, led Karimov to look for assistance from Russia.
U.S. concerns about human rights violations of the Uzbek government had 
already prompted Karimov to think that the U.S. would not provide the means 
necessary for his regime’s protection against the internal threats represented by 
religious fundamentalists. U.S. support for refugees, defined by Uzbek authorities as 
terrorists, confirmed Karimov’s prior assumptions. 439 Uzbek refugees were 
transferred from Kyrgyzstan to Romania with the assistance of the U.S on 27 May 
2005. After days, Uzbekistan demanded the U.S. to leave K2 military base within 
180 days. 
The expulsion of U.S. troops from the K2 airbase was justified by the claim 
that Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan had been successfully completed 
successfully and thus the reason for the U.S. presence in the region had disappeared. 
In July 2005 this issue was discussed at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and all parties reached a consensus on ending the deployment of the 
U.S. troops in the region. However the real motive behind their agreement was their 
common fear from loss of the status, which would possibly be catalyzed by 
democracy promotion of US.
  The Treaty of Allied Relations between Uzbekistan and Russia promised 
joint action against the threats they might face. It was no coincidence that the 
strategic partnership between Russia and Uzbekistan was completed with the 
approval of Treaty of Allied Relations on 14 November 2005 when last U.S. 
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personnel left the K2 airbase. The comparative advantages Russia offered were 
immediately exploited by Uzbekistan in order to strengthen its regime and to dispose 
the presence of foreign actors (U.S and European Union) 
The suspension of financial assistance and the E.U. embargo on arms trade 
with Uzbekistan also pushed Karimov to increase the extent of his cooperation with 
Russia, which used its energy resources as a mean of political manipulation in the 
region. “The investment of Russian energy giants Gazprom and Lukoil in Uzbekistan 
is expected to amount about the US$ 2.5 billion a figure that would dwarf any US 
investment so far”269 The Karimov regime, desperately needing flow of cash, was 
quick to capitalize on the situation.  
Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from GUUAM,270 an organization that excluded 
Russia and aimed at maximal collaboration with NATO, was a consequence of its 
developing cooperation with Russia.271 Uzbekistan’s entry into EurAsEc (Eurasian 
Economic Community-Unified Economic Space Project)272 on 25 January 2006 was 
another implication of regional cooperation between Russia and other Central Asian 
countries. Lastly, Uzbekistan rejoined the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, from which it departed in 1999, claiming that it did not want to be a 
part of a political military block.273  The re-establishment of close relations with 
Eurasian countries and Russia implied that regional cooperation against religious 
radicalism and the U.S. presence in the region would be used as a balancing power. 
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To sum up, it can be deduced from the reversal in Uzbek foreign policy after 
the Andican Uprising that this domestic event had a profound effect on the changing 
balances of power politics. Relations with the U.S and EU deteriorated after Andican 
Uprising. Both the authoritarian response to this event and prior problems related to 
the social policies of Uzbekistan increased the number of its western critics. These 
critics then turned to sanctions, which impelled Uzbekistan to search for new 
alignments. This process resulted in the rise of regional cooperation and increasing 
collaboration with Russia and China. Thus Uzbek government’s domestic affairs 
contributed to changes in the broader international relations.  
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Multiplicity of factors in the evaluation of Andican Uprising necessitated the 
development of a multidimensional perspective to explain this specific event. 
Reasons, essence and consequences of the event are actually having an interactive 
characteristic. In order to understand what caused the Andican Uprising, it is 
necessary to look at the results and the nature of the protest and vice versa. 
In addition to the separate contribution of reasons to revolutionary outcome 
they have also affected each other to some extent. For instance, it was seen that 
economic dissatisfaction prompted people to organize around the Ekremiye group
whose motives were not close to secular character of the state. By applying to 
religious principles is group tried to increase the extent of solidarity among the 
society. By means of this solidarity they aimed to increase economic prosperity. 
However, in return of their help to needed people, they required from affiliates to 
adopt and defend religious sentiments in their daily life. This was clearly seen in the 
organizational structure and ideological motives of the group. In this context, it was 
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educed that this group used its financial sources to emit the ideas of Ekrem 
Yuldashev. 
Direct influence of this group with the uprising can be related to the massive 
support to 23 businessmen who were arrested with the charges of being members of 
religious Ekremiye group. However, destruction of an alternative economic society, 
which had been created by the members of Ekremiye group, also increased the 
discontent of protesters who lost their jobs after the arrest of these 23 businessmen. 
In this context the most prominent motivation of protesters in Andican Uprising was 
not their commitment to religious characteristic of   Ekremiye group only. 
In the beginning of this study, the extent of threat presented by Hizb-ut Tahrir
and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was analyzed in order to examine the 
authenticity of Uzbek officials claim that Andican uprising was organized by 
religious extremist organizations. At the end of this exploration it was seen that Hizb-
ut Tahrir and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan clearly exposed a threat to the secular 
character of Uzbekistan. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir claimed that its operational method was not violent. However, 
the conclusion can be drawn from its draft constitution that peril it posed for 
secularism was quite high. In this context similarity between operational methods of 
Hizb ut- Tahrir and additional text to “Yimango Yul” of Ekrem Yuldashev increased 
the possibility of connection between these two groups. Although the writer of this 
additional text was not identified, Uzbek government preferred to trust this document 
in its persecution of 23 businessmen.  This preference of government can be 
explained by its so far fear from the existence of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan. This paper clearly does not either ignore the view that 
oppressive policies of Karimov may have radicalized religious sentiments of people 
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in Uzbekistan or interrogate the intimacy of Karimov in his war on fundamentalism.  
He may have dealt with religious opposition for the survival of his regime only; but 
this is not an issue of this paper. The question here is that whether or not religious 
sentiments somehow affected the rise of Andican Uprising; and this paper’s answer 
to this question is yes. Although Ekremiye group was neither an extremist nor 
terrorist organization; it still contributes to the threat over the secular principles in 
Uzbekistan due to its promotion of religious sentiments in daily life and business 
sector.
Economic factors behind the uprising were also analyzed in order to measure 
the actual share of economic discontent in the emergence of Andican Uprising. In the 
end of the survey it was seen that; although Uzbek government conducted rational 
policies to stabilize the economy, microeconomic implications of them were 
destructive for small sized traders and rural population in the country. Restriction on 
access to cash by government was applied in order to control the devaluation of the 
currency and decrease the share of import and unregistered trade in the economy. 
However these macroeconomic policies resulted in loss of jobs and ironically 
increased the extent of informal activities. Use of credit cards were required by 
government to decrease the circulation of cash money, this practice consequently 
necessitated the removal of small sized unregistered traders in bazaars whose 
accountability had been low. Combined with destruction of bazaars, their insufficient 
capital to open registered stores left bazaar traders unemployed. Rural population of 
the country suffered from cash restriction, traditional shirkat administrations and 
state-buying monopoly. All these factors ultimately contributed to the economic 
dissatisfaction expressed by demonstrators during Andican uprising. In this context 
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the assumption that economical problems have a greater role in protests on 13 May 
2005 was not baseless.
As a part of this study, mutual development of domestic and international 
factors within the context of Andican Uprising was explored. In this exploration it 
was questioned whether or not Andican uprising was influenced by colored 
revolutions which toppled authoritarian regimes in post Soviet countries. In order to 
reach a decision on this matter, similarities among toppled regimes and their relations 
with the U.S. were pointed out. Exploration of these possibilities showed that all of 
the toppled regimes were to some extent authoritarian and corruption of institutions 
and officials was determining cause in revolutionary movements. It is also true that 
the U.S has had strategic concerns over the region and its support to civil society 
organizations under the title of democracy promotion was supposed to have 
strengthened its influence. Except Ukraine, all of the other countries were keen to 
collaborate with the U.S. on security issues. However continuing relations of them 
with Russia may have led the U.S. to increase its relative gains. In this context 
intense economic relations of Uzbekistan with Russia and their strategic partnership 
since 2004 might have led the U.S. to take initiative against Karimov regime. 
It should not be forgotten that Uzbekistan actually was pushed towards 
Russia by the U.S.   Critics of the U.S. on Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record led 
Karimov to cooperate with more “reliable” powers. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan who was 
in desperate need of cash flow, had already been attracted by Russian promise for 
investment in its energy sector. In this context it may be reasonable to think that the 
U.S. has sympathized Andican Uprising but channels of this sympathy seemed to be 
locked in Uzbekistan. As a part of this exploration, conditions of civil society 
organizations in Uzbekistan were investigated. At the end of this investigation it was 
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understood that neither the number of civil society organizations nor their capacities 
were sufficient to create and mobilize public protests. Strict control on access to cash 
and bank regulations made it impossible for them, to withdraw money without a 
permission from the administration. Therefore, the idea of, civil society organizations 
could have used the U.S. financial aid to organize an uprising seems unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, high level of corruption in Uzbek institutions leaves open door to 
possibility that NGOs could receive and exploit the U.S aid in the absence of state 
control. However, this assumption remains to be a probability and not supported by 
evidence so far. Clan politics in Uzbekistan was also explained to investigate its 
affect on the emergence of Andican Uprising. By exploring the characteristics of 
informal politics in Uzbekistan I could reach the conclusion that regional fractions 
had an important role in economic and social discontent of the society. In terms of 
economic dimension, clan politics brought two important problems. First, clan 
leaders, who were reluctant to share their power, dominated the major business 
sectors in Uzbekistan. Second, suppression of loosing fractions’ supporters also left 
many people without job.  1000 thousand people who were left unemployed after the 
arrest of 23 businessmen in Andican is an instance of this mechanism.  Politically 
this suppression made loosing fractions subjected to harsh treatments during official 
investigations. Any effort dedicated to elimination of one clan increased the power of 
another; and problematical leadership of Karimov who used to make advantage of 
the system for his regime’s survival maintained the existence of this undemocratic 
structure. Balancing the powers of different clans could create stability in the country 
however it would not necessarily imply any democratic outcome.
At the end, what happened on Andican on 13 May 2005 was portrayed. 
Depiction of happenings showed that Andican uprising was flamed by an armed 
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group who released 23 businessmen. These 23 businessmen had been charged with 
commitment to religious group Ekremiye. Supporters of these 23 businessmen 
formed the first cycles of the uprising. The group who protested unjust trials of these 
23 businessmen was latterly accompanied by greater crowd, most of which consisted 
of women and children. In mobilization of crowd religious slogans were used. 
However as crowd grew, the nature of protests changed and economic complaints 
were raised on the stage. This showed that both economic and religious motives were 
present at the protest. Afterwards of the protest indicated that Andican uprising led to 
the intensification of state control over civil society and media. International reaction 
to indiscriminate use of force varied and this variation symbolized the polarization of 
states that supported or criticized Karimov’s regime. States who took different sides 
on this domestic problem of Uzbekistan also exhibited the characteristics of 
international rivalry in the region. Foreign policy implications of the uprising 
displayed the reversal of Uzbek policies in international context. These 
characteristics of the event proved that border between foreign and domestic policy 
blurred and balance of power, to which Uzbekistan applied, exhibited the effect of 
structural system on domestic decision-making process.
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Draft Constitution by Hizb ut-Tahrir
GENERAL RULES 
Article 1 
The Islamic ‘Aqeedah constitutes the foundation of the State. Nothing is permitted to 
exist in the government’s structure, accountability, or any other aspect connected 
with the government, that does not take the ‘Aqeedah as its source. The ‘Aqeedah is 
also the source for the State’s constitution and shar’i canons. Nothing connected to 
the constitution or canons is permitted to exist unless it emanates from the Islamic
‘Aqeedah. 
Article 2 
The domain of Islam (Daar ul-Islam) is that entity which applies the rules of Islam in 
life’s affairs and whose security do Muslims maintain. The domain of disbelief 
(Daar ul-Kufr) is that entity which applies the rules of kufr and whose security is 
maintained by the kuffaar
. 
Article 3 
The Khaleefah is empowered to adopt divine rules (aHkaam shar’iyyah) enacted as 
constitution and canons. Once the Khaleefah has adopted a divine rule, that rule 
alone becomes the divine rule that must be enacted and then implemented. Every 
citizen must openly and secretly obey that adopted rule. 
Article 4 
The Khaleefah does not adopt divine rules pertaining to worship, i.e. ibadaat, except 
in connection with alms (zakaah) and war (jihaad). Also, he does not adopt any of 
the thoughts connected with the Islamic ‘Aqeedah. 
Article 5 
All citizens of the Islamic State are entitled to enjoy the divine rights and duties. 
Article 6 
All citizens of the State shall be treated equally regardless of religion, race, colour or 
any other matter. The State is forbidden to discriminate among its citizens in all 
matters, be it ruling or judicial, or caring of affairs. 
                                                
275 Media Office of Hizb ut-Tahrir. http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/constitution.htm (August 4, 
2008)
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Article 7 
The State implements the aHkaam shar’iyyah on all citizens who hold citizenship of 
the Islamic State, whether Muslims or not, in the following manner: 
a.    The aHkaam shar’iyyah is implemented in its entirety, without exception, on all 
Muslims.
b.   Non-Muslims are allowed to follow their own beliefs and worships. 
c.   Those who are guilty of apostasy (murtadd) from Islam are to be executed 
according to the rule of apostasy, provided they have by themselves renounced 
Islam. If they are born as non-Muslims, i.e., if they are the sons of apostates, then 
they are treated as non-Muslims according to their status as being either 
polytheists (mushriks) or People of the Book. 
d.   In matters of food and clothing the non-Muslims are treated according to their 
religions within the limits allowed by aHkam Shara’iah. 
e.   Marital affairs (including divorce) among non-Muslims are settled in accordance 
with their religions, but between non-Muslims and Muslims they are settled 
according to the aHkaam shar’iyyah.
f.    All the remaining shar’i matters and rules, such as: the application of 
transactions, punishments and evidences (at court), the system of ruling and 
economics are implemented by the State upon everyone, Muslim and non-
Muslim alike. This includes the people of treaties (mu’aahid), the protected 
subjects (ahludh dhimmah) and all who submit to the authority of Islam. The 
implementation on these people is the same as the implementation on the subjects 
of the State. Ambassadors and envoys enjoy diplomatic immunity. 
Article 8 
Arabic is the language of Islam and the sole language of the State. 
Article 9 
Ijtihaad (personal exertion to derive the Islamic rule) is farD kifaayah (a collective 
duty). Every Muslim has the right to exercise ijtihaad if he has acquired the 
necessary conditions to perform it. 
Article 10 
There is no such thing as a clergy in Islam as all Muslims bear the responsibility for 
Islam. The State will prevent anything that indicates the existence of a clergy among 
Muslims. 
Article 11 
The primary function of the State is the propagation of the invitation (da’wah) to 
Islam. 
Article 12 
The only evidences to be considered for the divine rules (aHkaam shar’iyyah) are: 
the Qur’an, the Sunnah, the consensus of the Companions (ijmaa’ us-SaHaabah) and 
analogy (qiyaas). Legislation cannot be taken from any source other than these 
evidences. 
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Article 13 
Every individual is innocent until proven guilty. No person shall be punished without 
a court sentence. Torturing is absolutely forbidden and whoever inflicts torture on 
anyone shall be punished. 
Article 14 
All human actions are, in origin, restricted by the divine rules (aHkaam shar’iyyah), 
and no action shall be undertaken until its rule (Hukm) is known. Every thing or 
object is permitted, i.e., Halaal, unless there is an evidence of prohibition. 
Article 15 
Any means that most likely leads to a prohibition (Haraam) is itself Haraam. 
However if it was (only) feared that it may lead to a prohibition, then it would not be 
Haraam. 
THE RULING SYSTEM 
Article 16 
The ruling system of the State is that of a unitary ruling system and not a federation. 
Article 17 
Ruling is centralised and administration is de-centralised. 
Article 18 
There are four positions of ruling in the State. They are: The Khaleefah , the 
delegated assistant (mu’aawin ut-tafweeD), the governor (wali), the provincial mayor 
(‘aamil). All other officials of the State are employees and not rulers. 
Article 19 
No one is permitted to take charge of ruling, or any action considered to be of the 
nature of ruling, except a male who is free (Hurr), i.e. not a slave, mature (baaligh), 
sane (‘aaqil), trustworthy (‘adl), competent; and he must not be save a muslim. 
Article 20 
Calling upon the rulers to account for their actions is both a right for the Muslims 
and a farD kifaayah (collective duty) upon them. Non-Muslim subjects have the right 
to make known their complaints about the rulers’ injustice and misapplication of the 
Islamic rules upon them. 
Article 21 
Muslims are entitled to establish political parties to question the rulers and to access 
the positions of ruling through the Ummah on condition that the parties are based on 
the ‘Aqeedah of Islam and their adopted rules are aHkaam shar’iyyah; the 
establishment of such a party does not require a license by the State. Any party not 
established on the basis of Islam is prohibited. 
Article 22 
The ruling system is founded upon four principles. They are: 
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1.   Sovereignty belongs to the divine law (shara’) and not to the people.
2.   Authority belongs to the people, i.e., the Ummah.
3.   The appointment of one Khaleefah into office is an obligation upon all Muslims.
4.   Only the Khaleefah has the right to adopt the aHkaam shar’iyyah and thus he 
passes the constitution and the various canons. 
Article 23 
The State systems are made up of eight institutions. They are: 
1.      The Khaleefah (Al-khaleefah).
2.      The delegated assistant (mu’aawin at-tafweeD).
3.      The executing assistants (mu’aawin at-tanfeedh).
4.      Amir of jihad (Ameerul jihad).
5.      Governors (Wulaah).
6.      Judges (QuDaah).
7.      The state departments (maSaaliH ud-dawlah).
8.      The council of the Ummah (majlis ul-Ummah)
THE KHALEEFAH 
Article 24 
The Khaleefah is deputised by the Ummah with authority to implement the shar’.
Article 25 
Khilafah is a contract of nomination and acceptance. No one is obliged to accept it 
and no one is obliged to nominate a particular person for it. 
Article 26 
Every mature male and female Muslim, who is sane, has the right to participate in the 
election of the Khaleefah and in giving him the pledge (ba’iah). Non-Muslims have 
no right in this regard. 
Article 27 
Once the contract of the Khilafah has been concluded on a person through the ba’iah
of those by whom the ba’iah is legitimately concluded, the ba’iah of the remaining 
people is a ba’iah of obedience and not contract. Consequently, those who might 
disobey or rebel are obliged to give ba’iah. 
Article 28 
Nobody can become Khaleefah without being appointed by the Muslims. Nobody 
can hold the power of the Khilafah unless it is convened to him legitimately, as is the 
case with any contract in Islam. 
Article 29 
Any country that wishes to give the Khaleefah the ba’iah of contract, her sulTaan 
(authority) must be self-acting that depends on Muslims only and not on any kaafir
state. The security of the Muslims in that country, both internally and externally, 
must be maintained by the security of Islam and not kufr. 
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As for the ba’iah of obedience only, it can be taken from any other country without 
such conditions. 
Article 30 
The individual who is given the ba’iah for Khilafah need only to fulfill the 
contracting conditions, even if he did not fulfil the preferable conditions, because 
what is essential is the conditions of contracting. 
Article 31 
There are seven conditions needed in the Khaleefah so that the Khilafah can be 
contracted to him. They are to be a male, Muslim, free (Hurr), mature (baaligh), sane 
(‘aaqil), trustworthy (‘adl) and able (qaadir).
Article 32 
If the post of the Khaleefah becomes vacant, due to death, resignation or dismissal, 
the appointment of a new Khaleefah must take place within three days, which 
includes the nights from the date when it became vacant. 
Article 33 
The Khaleefah is to be appointed in the following manner: 
a.      The Muslim members of the Majlis ul-Ummah short-list the candidates for that 
post. Their names are subsequently announced and the Muslims are asked to elect 
one person from them.
b.      The result of the election is announced and the person who has attained the 
majority of the votes is to be announced to the Muslims.
c.      The Muslims must hasten to give ba’iah to the one who has attained the 
majority of votes as a Khaleefah for Muslims on the condition of following the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Messenger (saw). 
d.      Once the ba’iah has been accomplished, the name of the man who has become 
the Khaleefah along with a statement that he has met the conditions necessary for 
holding the office of Khilafah is announced to the people so that the news of his 
appointment reaches the entire Ummah. 
Article 34 
The Ummah has the authority to appoint the Khaleefah but she has no right to 
dismiss him after he has legitimately attained the ba’iah of contracting. 
Article 35 
The Khaleefah is the State. He possesses all the powers and function of the State; he 
possesses the following powers: 
a.   The Khaleefah implements the aHkaam shar’iyyah, once he adopted them, into 
law, and as such they become canons that must be obeyed and not violated. 
b.   The Khaleefah is responsible for both the internal and external policies of the 
State. He takes charge of the leadership of the army and has the right to declare 
war, conclude peace, armistice, and treaties. 
c.  The Khaleefah has the authority to accept and reject foreign ambassadors, and to 
appoint and dismiss Muslim ambassadors. 
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d.   The Khaleefah appoints and dismisses the assistants (mu’aawineen) and the 
governors (wulaah). The assistants and governors are responsible to the 
Khaleefah as well as to the Majlis al-Ummah.
e.   The Khaleefah appoints and dismisses the chief judge, the directors of 
departments, the heads of the armed forces and the generals; all of whom are 
responsible to the Khaleefah and not to the Majlis al-Ummah.
a.   The Khaleefah adopts the aHkaam shar’iyyah by which the State’s budget is set. 
The Khaleefah decides its sections and the funds required for every field, whether 
they are related to revenue or expenditure. 
Article 36 
The Khaleefah is restricted in what he adopts by the aHkaam shar’iyyah. He is 
forbidden to adopt any rule that is not soundly deduced from the divine texts. He is 
restricted to the rules he has adopted and to the method for deduction that he has 
chosen. Accordingly, he is prevented from adopting a rule deduced by a method that 
contradicts the method he has adopted, and he must not enact any command that 
contradicts the rules he has adopted. 
Article 37 
The Khaleefah has the absolute right to conduct the citizens affairs according to his 
ijtihaad, so he has the right to adopt of the mubaaH matters anything he wants to run 
the State affairs and to look after the affairs of the citizens. However, he is not 
allowed to disagree with a Hukm shar’i under the name of interest. For example; he 
cannot prevent a family from having more than one child under the pretext of the 
shortage in food. Nor can he fix prices on the pretext of preventing exploitation; or 
appoint a kaafir or a woman as a waali on the pretext of caring for affairs or the 
interest, nor anything that disagrees with sharee’ah rules. The Khaleefah must not 
forbid any Halaal thing or allow any Haraam thing. 
Article 38 
There is no limitation on the Khaleefah’s period in office. So as long as he abides by 
the shara’, implements its rules and is able to manage the State’s affairs, he 
continues as a Khaleefah unless his situation changes in such a way as to discharge 
him from the office of Khilafah. He is to be dismissed immediately, once such a 
situation occurred. 
Article 39 
There are three matters by which the situation of the Khaleefah changes, and by such 
he is discharged from the office of Khilafah. They are: 
a.    If one of the qualifying conditions of the Khilafah contract becomes void, such 
as apostatising from Islam, insanity or manifest sinfulness (fisq) and the like.  
This is because these are conditions for contracting the Khilafah and for its 
continuity. 
b.   His inability to undertake the responsibilities of the Khilafah post, for any 
reason. 
c.    In the event of sub-dual, whereby the Khaleefah is rendered unable to conduct 
the affairs of the Muslims by his own opinion according to the shara’. If the 
Khaleefah is subdued by any force to an extent that he is unable to manage the 
citizens affairs by his own opinion alone according to the rules of shara’, he is 
considered to be legitimately incapable of undertaking the functions of the state, 
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and thus he ceases to be a Khaleefah. This situation may arise under two 
circumstances. They are: 
Firstly. When one, or more of the Khaleefah’s entourage exerts 
control over the management of affairs. If there is a chance that the 
Khaleefah could rid himself of their dominance he is cautioned for a 
specified period of time, after which, if he fails to rid himself of their 
dominance, he must be dismissed. If it appears that there is no chance of the 
Khaleefah freeing himself from their dominance, he is to be dismissed 
immediately. 
Secondly. Should the Khaleefah be captured by a subduing enemy, 
whether he is actually captured or under its influence. In this case the 
situation is to be examined; if there is a chance to rescue the Khaleefah, he is 
given a period of time until it appears that there is no hope to rescue him, 
after which he is dismissed. Should it appear from the outset that there is no 
hope of rescuing him, he is to be dismissed immediately. 
Article 40 
The responsibility of deciding whether or not the Khaleefah’s situation has altered in 
such a way as to warrant his dismissal is the prerogative of the Court for the Acts of 
Injustice (maHkamat al-maZaalim). It alone has the authority to admonish or dismiss 
the Khaleefah.
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APPENDIX IV: MAP OF UZBEKISTAN276
                                                
276 http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/uzbekist.pdf
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APPENDIX V: AKRAM YULDASHEV'S COMMENTARY 
ON AS-SAFF SURAH277
                                                
277 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Akram Yuldashev's Commentary on as-Saff Surah”  
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18453&prog=zru (August 
4, 2008)
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